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Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc. 
 
15-777 
 
Ruling Below: Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Plaintiff Apple sued Defendant Samsung alleging that the South Korean tech company infringed 
on Apple’s patented iPhone designs. The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California, San Jose Division, entered judgement against Samsung.   
The U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment awarding Apple 
the “total profits” of the Samsung smartphone devices named in the lawsuit. However, the court 
vacated the district court's judgment that the competitors committed trade dress infringement and 
remanded the case. 
Question Presented: Whether, where a design patent is applied to only a component of a 
product, an award of infringer’s profits should be limited to those profits attributable to the 
component. 
 
APPLE INC., a California corporation 
v. 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., 
A Korean corporation, 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 
A New York corporation, 
SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, LLC 
A Delaware limited liability company 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
 
Decided on May 18, 2015 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
 
PROST, Chief Judge. 
 
Background 
 
Apple sued Samsung in April 2011. On 
August 24, 2012, the first jury reached a 
verdict that numerous Samsung smartphones 
infringed and diluted Apple's patents and 
trade dresses in various combinations and 
awarded over $1 billion in damages. 
 
The infringed design patents are U.S. Design 
Patent Nos. D618,677 ("D'677 patent"), 
D593,087 ("D'087"), and D604,305 
("D'305"), which claim certain design 
elements embodied in Apple's iPhone. The 
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infringed utility patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 
7,469,381 ("'381 patent"), 7,844,915 ("915 
patent"), and 7,864,163 ("163 patent), which 
claim certain features in the iPhone's user 
interface. The diluted trade dresses are 
Trademark Registration No. 3,470,983 ("'983 
trade dress") and an unregistered trade dress 
defined in terms of certain elements in the 
configuration of the iPhone. 
 
Following the first jury trial, the district court 
upheld the jury's infringement, dilution, and 
validity findings over Samsung's post-trial 
motion. The district court also upheld 
$639,403,248 in damages, but ordered a 
partial retrial on the remainder of the 
damages because they had been awarded for 
a period when Samsung lacked notice of 
some of the asserted patents. The jury in the 
partial retrial on damages awarded Apple 
$290,456,793, which the district court upheld 
over Samsung's second post-trial motion. On 
March 6, 2014, the district court entered a 
final judgment in favor of Apple, and 
Samsung filed a notice of appeal. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 
 
Discussion 
 
We review the denial of Samsung's post-trial 
motions under the Ninth Circuit's procedural 
standards. The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo 
a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter 
of law. "The test is whether the evidence, 
construed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, permits only one 
reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is 
contrary to that of the jury." 
 
The Ninth Circuit reviews a denial of a 
motion for a new trial for an abuse of 
discretion. "In evaluating jury instructions, 
prejudicial error results when, looking to the 
instructions as a whole, the substance of the 
applicable law was [not] fairly and correctly 
covered." The Ninth Circuit orders a new trial 
based on jury instruction error only if the 
error was prejudicial. A motion for a new trial 
based on insufficiency of evidence may be 
granted "only if the verdict is against the 
great weight of the evidence, or it is quite 
clear that the jury has reached a seriously 
erroneous result."  
 
Samsung appeals numerous legal and 
evidentiary bases for the liability findings 
and damages awards in the three categories 
of intellectual property asserted by Apple: 
trade dresses, design patents, and utility 
patents. We address each category in turn. 
 
I. Trade Dresses 
 
The jury found Samsung liable for the likely 
dilution of Apple's iPhone trade dresses 
under the Lanham Act. When reviewing 
Lanham Act claims, we look to the law of the 
regional circuit where the district court sits. 
We therefore apply Ninth Circuit law. 
 
The Ninth Circuit has explained that "[t]rade 
dress is the totality of elements in which a 
product or service is packaged or presented." 
The essential purpose of a trade dress is the 
same as that of a trademarked word: to 
identify the source of the product. In this 
respect, "protection for trade dress exists to 
promote competition."  
 
The protection for source identification, 
however, must be balanced against "a 
fundamental right to compete through 
imitation of a competitor's product . . . ." This 
"right can only be temporarily denied by the 
patent or copyright laws." In contrast, 
trademark law allows for a perpetual 
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monopoly and its use in the protection of 
"physical details and design of a product" 
must be limited to those that are 
"nonfunctional." Thus, it is necessary for us 
to determine first whether Apple's asserted 
trade dresses, claiming elements from its 
iPhone product, are nonfunctional and 
therefore protectable. 
 
"In general terms, a product feature is 
functional if it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost 
or quality of the article." "A product feature 
need only have some utilitarian advantage to 
be considered functional." A trade dress, 
taken as a whole, is functional if it is "in its 
particular shape because it works better in 
this shape." 
 
"[C]ourts have noted that it is, and should be, 
more difficult to claim product configuration 
trade dress than other forms of trade dress." 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court and the 
Ninth Circuit have repeatedly found product 
configuration trade dresses functional and 
therefore non-protectable.  
 
Moreover, federal trademark registrations 
have been found insufficient to save product 
configuration trade dresses from conclusions 
of functionality. The Ninth Circuit has even 
reversed a jury verdict of non-functionality of 
a product configuration trade dress. Apple 
conceded during oral argument that it had not 
cited a single Ninth Circuit case that found a 
product configuration trade dress to be non-
functional.  
 
 The Ninth Circuit's high bar for non-
functionality frames our review of the two 
iPhone trade dresses on appeal. While the 
parties argue without distinguishing the two 
trade dresses, the unregistered trade dress and 
the registered '983 trade dress claim different 
details and are afforded different evidentiary 
presumptions under the Lanham Act. We 
analyze the two trade dresses separately 
below. 
 
A. Unregistered Trade Dress 
 
Apple claims elements from its iPhone 3G 
and 3GS products to define the asserted 
unregistered trade dress: 
 
 a rectangular product with four 
evenly rounded corners; 
 
 a flat, clear surface covering the front 
of the product; 
 
 a display screen under the clear 
surface; 
 
 substantial black borders above and 
below the display screen and 
narrower black borders on either side 
of the screen; and 
 
 when the device is on, a row of small 
dots on the display screen, a matrix of 
colorful square icons with evenly 
rounded corners within the display 
screen, and an unchanging bottom 
dock of colorful square icons with 
evenly rounded corners set off from 
the display's other icons. 
 
As this trade dress is not registered on the 
principal federal trademark register, Apple 
"has the burden of proving that the claimed 
trade dress, taken as a whole, is not functional 
. . . ." 
 
Apple argues that the unregistered trade dress 
is nonfunctional under each of the Disc Golf 
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factors that the Ninth Circuit uses to analyze 
functionality: "(1) whether the design yields 
a utilitarian advantage, (2) whether 
alternative designs are available, (3) whether 
advertising touts the utilitarian advantages of 
the design, and (4) whether the particular 
design results from a comparatively simple or 
inexpensive method of manufacture." 
However, the Supreme Court has more 
recently held that "a feature is also functional 
. . . when it affects the cost or quality of the 
device." The Supreme Court's holding was 
recognized by the Ninth Circuit as "short 
circuiting some of the Disc Golf factors." 
Nevertheless, we explore Apple's contentions 
on each of the Disc Golf factors and conclude 
that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a jury finding in favor of 
nonfunctionality on any factor. 
 
1. Utilitarian Advantage 
 
Apple argues that "the iPhone's physical 
design did not 'contribute unusually . . . to the 
usability' of the device." Apple further 
contends that the unregistered trade dress was 
"developed . . . not for 'superior 
performance.'" Neither "unusual usability" 
nor "superior performance," however, is the 
standard used by the Ninth Circuit to 
determine whether there is any utilitarian 
advantage. The Ninth Circuit "has never held, 
as [plaintiff] suggests, that the product 
feature must provide superior utilitarian 
advantages. To the contrary, [the Ninth 
Circuit] has suggested that in order to 
establish nonfunctionality the party with the 
burden must demonstrate that the product 
feature serves no purpose other than 
identification."  
 
The requirement that the unregistered trade 
dress "serves no purpose other than 
identification" cannot be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence. Apple emphasizes a single 
aspect of its design, beauty, to imply the lack 
of other advantages. But the evidence showed 
that the iPhone's design pursued more than 
just beauty. Specifically, Apple's executive 
testified that the theme for the design of the 
iPhone was: 
 
“to create a new breakthrough design 
for a phone that was beautiful and 
simple and easy to use and created a 
beautiful, smooth surface that had a 
touchscreen and went right to the rim 
with the bezel around it and looking 
for a look that we found was beautiful 
and easy to use and appealing.” 
 
Moreover, Samsung cites extensive evidence 
in the record that showed the usability 
function of every single element in the 
unregistered trade dress. For example, 
rounded corners improve "pocketability" and 
"durability" and rectangular shape 
maximizes the display that can be 
accommodated. A flat clear surface on the 
front of the phone facilitates touch operation 
by fingers over a large display. The bezel 
protects the glass from impact when the 
phone is dropped. The borders around the 
display are sized to accommodate other 
components while minimizing the overall 
product dimensions. The row of dots in the 
user interface indicates multiple pages of 
application screens that are available. The 
icons allow users to differentiate the 
applications available to the users and the 
bottom dock of unchanging icons allows for 
quick access to the most commonly used 
applications. Apple rebuts none of this 
evidence. 
 
Apple conceded during oral argument that its 
trade dress "improved the quality [of the 
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iPhone] in some respects." It is thus clear that 
the unregistered trade dress has a utilitarian 
advantage. 
 
2. Alternative Designs 
 
The next factor requires that purported 
alternative designs "offer exactly the same 
features" as the asserted trade dress in order 
to show non-functionality. A manufacturer 
"does not have rights under trade dress law to 
compel its competitors to resort to alternative 
designs which have a different set of 
advantages and disadvantages." 
 
Apple, while asserting that there were 
"numerous alternative designs," fails to show 
that any of these alternatives offered exactly 
the same features as the asserted trade dress. 
Apple simply catalogs the mere existence of 
other design possibilities embodied in 
rejected iPhone prototypes and other 
manufacturers' smartphones. The "mere 
existence" of other designs, however, does 
not prove that the unregistered trade dress is 
non-functional.  
 
3. Advertising of Utilitarian Advantages 
 
"If a seller advertises the utilitarian 
advantages of a particular feature, this 
constitutes strong evidence of functionality." 
An "inference" of a product feature's utility in 
the plaintiff's advertisement is enough to 
weigh in favor of functionality of a trade 
dress encompassing that feature.  
 
Apple argues that its advertising was "[f]ar 
from touting any utilitarian advantage of the 
iPhone design . . . ." Apple relies on its 
executive's testimony that an iPhone 
advertisement, portraying "the distinctive 
design very clearly," was based on Apple's 
"product as hero" approach. The "product as 
hero" approach refers to Apple's stylistic 
choice of making "the product the biggest, 
clearest, most obvious thing in [its] 
advertisements, often at the expense of 
anything else around it, to remove all the 
other elements of communication so [the 
viewer] see[s] the product most 
predominantly in the marketing."  
 
Apple's arguments focusing on its stylistic 
choice, however, fail to address the substance 
of its advertisements. The substance of the 
iPhone advertisement relied upon by Apple 
gave viewers "the ability to see a bit about 
how it might work," for example, "how 
flicking and scrolling and tapping and all 
these multitouch ideas simply [sic]." Another 
advertisement cited by Apple similarly 
displayed the message, "[t]ouching is 
believing," under a picture showing a user's 
hand interacting with the graphical user 
interface of an iPhone. Apple fails to show 
that, on the substance, these demonstrations 
of the user interface on iPhone's touch screen 
involved the elements claimed in Apple's 
unregistered trade dress and why they were 
not touting the utilitarian advantage of the 
unregistered trade dress. 
 
4. Method of Manufacture 
 
The fourth factor considers whether a 
functional benefit in the asserted trade dress 
arises from "economies in manufacture or 
use," such as being "relatively simple or 
inexpensive to manufacture."  
 
Apple contends that "[t]he iPhone design did 
not result from a 'comparatively simple or 
inexpensive method of manufacture'" 
because Apple experienced manufacturing 
challenges. Apple's manufacturing 
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challenges, however, resulted from the 
durability considerations for the iPhone and 
not from the design of the unregistered trade 
dress. According to Apple's witnesses, 
difficulties resulted from its choices of 
materials in using "hardened steel"; "very 
high, high grade of steel"; and, "glass that 
was not breakable enough, scratch resistant 
enough." These materials were chosen, for 
example, for the iPhone to survive a drop: 
 
    If you drop this, you don't have to worry 
about the ground hitting the glass. You 
have to worry about the band of steel 
surrounding the glass hitting the glass. . . 
. In order to, to make it work, we had to 
use very high, high grade of steel because 
we couldn't have it sort of deflecting into 
the glass. 
 
The durability advantages that resulted from 
the manufacturing challenges, however, are 
outside the scope of what Apple defines as its 
unregistered trade dress. For the design 
elements that comprise Apple's unregistered 
trade dress, Apple points to no evidence in 
the record to show they were not relatively 
simple or inexpensive to manufacture.  
 
In sum, Apple has failed to show that there 
was substantial evidence in the record to 
support a jury finding in favor of non-
functionality for the unregistered trade dress 
on any of the Disc Golf factors. Apple fails to 
rebut the evidence that the elements in the 
unregistered trade dress serve the functional 
purpose of improving usability. Rather, 
Apple focuses on the "beauty" of its design, 
even though Apple pursued both "beauty" 
and functionality in the design of the iPhone. 
We therefore reverse the district court's 
denial of Samsung's motion for judgment as 
a matter of law that the unregistered trade 
dress is functional and therefore not 
protectable. 
B. The Registered '983 Trade Dress 
 
In contrast to the unregistered trade dress, the 
'983 trade dress is a federally registered 
trademark. The federal trademark registration 
provides "prima facie evidence" of non-
functionality. Once this presumption is 
overcome, the registration loses its legal 
significance on the issue of functionality.  
 
The '983 trade dress claims the design details 
in each of the sixteen icons on the iPhone's 
home screen framed by the iPhone's rounded-
rectangular shape with silver edges and a 
black background: 
 
    The first icon depicts the letters 
"SMS" in green inside a white 
speech bubble on a green 
background; 
 
    . . . 
 
    the seventh icon depicts a map 
with yellow and orange roads, a pin 
with a red head, and a redand-blue 
road sign with the numeral "280" in 
white; 
 
    . . . 
 
    the sixteenth icon depicts the 
distinctive configuration of 
applicant's media player device in 
white over an orange background. 
 
'983 trade dress (omitting thirteen other icon 
design details for brevity). 
 
It is clear that individual elements claimed by 
the '983 trade dress are functional. For 
example, there is no dispute that the claimed 
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details such as "the seventh icon depicts a 
map with yellow and orange roads, a pin with 
a red head, and a red-and-blue road sign with 
the numeral '280' in white" are functional. 
Apple's user interface expert testified on how 
icon designs promote usability. This expert 
agreed that "the whole point of an icon on a 
smartphone is to communicate to the 
consumer using that product, that if they hit 
that icon, certain functionality will occur on 
the phone." The expert further explained that 
icons are "[v]isual shorthand for something" 
and that "rectangular containers" for icons 
provide "more real estate" to accommodate 
the icon design. Apple rebuts none of this 
evidence. 
 
Apple contends instead that Samsung 
improperly disaggregates the '983 trade dress 
into individual elements to argue 
functionality. But Apple fails to explain how 
the total combination of the sixteen icon 
designs in the context of iPhone's screen-
dominated rounded-rectangular shape—all 
part of the iPhone's "easy to use" design 
theme—somehow negates the undisputed 
usability function of the individual elements. 
Apple's own brief even relies on its expert's 
testimony about the "instant recognizability 
due to highly intuitive icon usage" on "the 
home screen of the iPhone." Apple's expert 
was discussing an analysis of the iPhone's 
overall combination of icon designs that 
allowed a user to recognize quickly particular 
applications to use.  
 
The iPhone's usability advantage from the 
combination of its icon designs shows that 
the '983 trade dress viewed as a whole "is 
nothing other than the assemblage of 
functional parts . . . ." The undisputed facts 
thus demonstrate the functionality of the '983 
trade dress. "In the face of sufficient and 
undisputed facts demonstrating functionality, 
as in our case, the registration loses its 
evidentiary significance."  
 
The burden thus shifts back to Apple. But 
Apple offers no analysis of the icon designs 
claimed by the '983 trade dress. Rather, 
Apple argues generically for its two trade 
dresses without distinction under the Disc 
Golf factors. Among Apple's lengthy 
citations to the record, we can find only two 
pieces of information that involve icon 
designs. One is Apple's user interface expert 
discussing other possible icon designs. The 
other is a citation to a print iPhone 
advertisement that included the icon designs 
claimed in the '983 trade dress. These two 
citations, viewed in the most favorable light 
to Apple, would be relevant to only two of the 
Disc Golf factors: "alternative design" and 
"advertising." But the cited evidence suffers 
from the same defects as discussed in 
subsections I.A.2 and I.A.3. Specifically, the 
expert's discussion of other icon design 
possibilities does not show that the other 
design possibilities "offer[ed] exactly the 
same features" as the '983 trade dress. The 
print iPhone advertisement also fails to 
establish that, on the substance, it was not 
touting the utilitarian advantage of the '983 
trade dress. The evidence cited by Apple 
therefore does not show the non-functionality 
of the '983 trade dress. 
 
In sum, the undisputed evidence shows the 
functionality of the registered '983 trade dress 
and shifts the burden of proving non-
functionality back to Apple. Apple, however, 
has failed to show that there was substantial 
evidence in the record to support a jury 
finding in favor of non-functionality for the 
'983 trade dress on any of the Disc Golf 
factors. We therefore reverse the district 
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court's denial of Samsung's motion for 
judgment as a matter of law that the '983 trade 
dress is functional and therefore not 
protectable. 
 
Because we conclude that the jury's findings 
of nonfunctionality of the asserted trade 
dresses were not supported by substantial 
evidence, we do not reach Samsung's 
arguments on the fame and likely dilution of 
the asserted trade dresses, the Patent Clause 
of the Constitution, or the dilution damages. 
 
II. Design Patents 
 
The design patents on appeal claim certain 
design elements embodied in the iPhone. The 
focuses on design elements on the front face 
of the iPhone. 
 
Samsung contends that it should not have 
been found liable for infringement of the 
asserted design patents because any 
similarity was limited to the basic or 
functional elements in the design patents. 
Moreover, according to Samsung, there was 
no evidence of actual deception of consumers 
and that the differences between the accused 
smartphones and the asserted design patents 
should have been clear if prior art designs 
were properly considered. Samsung raises 
these three issues—functionality, actual 
deception, and comparison to prior art—in 
the context of the jury instructions and the 
sufficiency of evidence to support the 
infringement verdict. Finally, Samsung 
argues that the district court legally erred in 
allowing the jury to award as damages 
Samsung's entire profits on its infringing 
smartphones. We do not find any of these 
challenges persuasive as discussed below. 
 
A. Infringement 
 
1. Jury Instructions 
 
a. Functional Aspects in the Asserted Design 
Patents 
 
"Where a design contains both functional and 
nonfunctional elements, the scope of the 
claim must be construed in order to identify 
the non-functional aspects of the design as 
shown in the patent." Samsung contends that 
the district court erred in failing to exclude 
the functional aspects of the design patents 
either in the claim construction or elsewhere 
in the infringement jury instructions. 
Specifically, Samsung contends that the 
district court should have excluded elements 
that are "'dictated by their functional 
purpose,' or cover the 'structural . . . aspects 
of the article.'" Such elements, according to 
Samsung, should be "ignored" in their 
entirety from the design patent claim scope. 
For example, Samsung contends that 
rectangular form and rounded corners are 
among such elements that should be ignored 
in the infringement analysis.  
 
Our case law does not support Samsung's 
position. In Richardson, the design patent at 
issue depicted a multifunction tool with 
numerous components that were "dictated by 
their functional purpose." But the claim 
construction in Richardson did not exclude 
those components in their entirety. Rather, 
the claim construction included the 
ornamental aspects of those components: 
"the standard shape of the hammer-head, the 
diamond-shaped flare of the crow-bar and the 
top of the jaw, the rounded neck, the 
orientation of the crow-bar relative to the 
head of the tool, and the plain, undecorated 
handle." That construction was affirmed on 
appeal. As such, the language "dictated by 
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their functional purpose" in Richardson was 
only a description of the facts there; it did not 
establish a rule to eliminate entire elements 
from the claim scope as Samsung argues. 
 
Our case law likewise does not support 
Samsung's proposed rule of eliminating any 
"structural" aspect from the claim scope. 
Samsung arrives at its proposed rule by 
selecting a few words from the following 
statement in Lee: "[d]esign patents do not and 
cannot include claims to the structural or 
functional aspects of the article . . . ." But that 
statement addressed design patent validity. It 
did not specify a rule, as Samsung represents, 
to eliminate elements from the claim scope of 
a valid patent in analyzing infringement. 
 
More directly applicable to the claim scope 
issue at hand, Lee stated elsewhere that "it is 
the non-functional, design aspects that are 
pertinent to determinations of infringement." 
That principle was properly reflected in this 
case in the district court's construction of the 
design patents as claiming only "the 
ornamental design" as shown in the patent 
figures. Samsung has not persuasively shown 
how the district court's claim constructions 
were legally erroneous under Lee or 
Richardson.  
 
Samsung asserted alternatively during oral 
argument that the jury should have been 
instructed to compare the accused Samsung 
smartphones to the "overall ornamental 
appearance" of a patented design, instead of 
simply "the overall appearance" as the district 
court provided. According to Samsung, 
"crucially, what's missing there is the word 
'ornamental.'" But jury instructions are 
reviewed "as a whole" to determine whether 
"the substance of the applicable law was [not] 
fairly and correctly covered" such that the 
alleged error was prejudicial. The jury 
instructions, as a whole, already limited the 
scope of the asserted design patents to the 
"ornamental" elements through the claim 
constructions as discussed earlier: the design 
patents were each construed as claiming "the 
ornamental design" as shown in the patent 
figures. As such, Samsung has failed to show 
prejudicial error in the jury instructions as a 
whole that would warrant a new trial. 
 
b. Actual Deception and Role of Prior Art 
 
Samsung further contends that the 
infringement instruction was erroneous for 
stating that actual deception was not required, 
and for providing guidelines in considering 
prior art. A design patent is infringed if an 
ordinary observer would have been deceived: 
"if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving 
such attention as a purchaser usually gives, 
two designs are substantially the same, if the 
resemblance is such as to deceive such an 
observer, inducing him to purchase one 
supposing it to be the other, the first one 
patented is infringed by the other." Moreover, 
an infringement analysis must include a 
comparison of the asserted design against the 
prior art: "[i]f the accused design has copied 
a particular feature of the claimed design that 
departs conspicuously from the prior art, the 
accused design is naturally more likely to be 
regarded as deceptively similar to the 
claimed design, and thus infringing."  
 
These holdings from Gorham and Egyptian 
Goddess were reflected in the infringement 
instruction here, and Samsung does not 
contend otherwise. Samsung argues instead 
that the portions in the infringement 
instruction highlighted below made the jury 
consider a lack of actual deception irrelevant 
and led the jury to disregard the prior art: 
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“Two designs are substantially the 
same if, in the eye of an ordinary 
observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, the 
resemblance between the two designs 
is such as to deceive such an observer, 
inducing him to purchase one 
supposing it to be the other. You do 
not need, however, to find that any 
purchasers actually were deceived or 
confused by the appearance of the 
accused Samsung products. . . . 
 
This determination of whether two 
designs are substantially the same 
will benefit from comparing the two 
designs with prior art. You must 
familiarize yourself with the prior art 
admitted at trial in making your 
determination of whether there has 
been direct infringement. 
 
You may find the following 
guidelines helpful to your analysis . . 
. .” 
 
We conclude instead that the jury instruction 
simply clarified that actual deception was not 
required, which is an accurate reflection of 
the analysis in Gorham.  
 
We also conclude that the jury instruction 
expressly required that each juror "must" 
consider the prior art admitted at trial. The 
jury instruction's guidelines did not reduce 
the entire prior art analysis to a mere option 
as Samsung contends. 
 
Samsung again has failed to show that "when, 
looking to the instructions as a whole, the 
substance of the applicable law was [not] 
fairly and correctly covered."  
 
2. Supporting Evidence 
 
Samsung contends that the infringement 
verdict was not supported by substantial 
evidence. Samsung's contentions, however, 
are premised on the same issues—
functionality, actual deception, and 
comparison to prior art—it raises in the 
context of the jury instructions.  
 
Having rejected the jury instruction 
challenges, we likewise find Samsung's 
parallel substantial evidence complaints 
unpersuasive. Apple's witnesses provided 
sufficient testimonies to allow the jury to 
account for any functional aspects in the 
asserted design patents. Additionally, the 
witnesses testified on the similar overall 
visual impressions of the accused products to 
the asserted design patents such that an 
ordinary observer would likely be deceived. 
Apple's experts also testified about the 
differences between the asserted patents and 
both the prior art and other competing 
designs. The jury could have reasonably 
relied on the evidence in the record to reach 
its infringement verdict. 
 
3. Preclusion of Evidence 
 
Samsung also appeals the district court's 
preclusion of testimony on Samsung's 
independent development of its F700 phone 
that pre-dated the iPhone to rebut an 
allegation of copying. The evidence on the 
F700 was previously excluded as a prior art 
reference under a Rule 37 sanction due to 
Samsung's failure to timely disclose the 
evidence during discovery, which Samsung 
does not challenge. 
 
The district court found that Samsung's 
witness did not design any of the accused 
devices and was unaware that any of the 
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accused devices was based on the F700.  The 
district court thus determined that the 
proffered testimony of Samsung's witness 
would have limited probative value on the 
question of whether Samsung copied any of 
Apple's design patents because she lacked 
first-hand knowledge relevant to the 
underlying issue. As a result, the district court 
concluded that the limited probative value of 
the testimony was outweighed by the 
likelihood that it would be considered by the 
jury for the prohibited purpose under the 
earlier Rule 37 sanction. We find that the 
district court acted within its discretion in 
precluding Samsung's proffered testimony to 
rebut an allegation of copying. 
 
We conclude that there was no prejudicial 
legal error in the infringement jury 
instructions on the three issues that Samsung 
raises: functionality, actual deception, and 
comparison to prior art. We further conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding Samsung's evidence 
of independent development and that there 
was substantial evidence to support the jury's 
infringement findings. We therefore affirm 
the district court's denial of Samsung's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on 
design patent infringement and Samsung's 
alternative motion for a new trial. 
 
B. Damages 
 
Finally, with regard to the design patents, 
Samsung argues that the district court legally 
erred in allowing the jury to award Samsung's 
entire profits on its infringing smartphones as 
damages. The damages, according to 
Samsung, should have been limited to the 
profit attributable to the infringement 
because of "basic causation principles . . . ." 
Samsung contends that "Apple failed to 
establish that infringement of its limited 
design patents . . . caused any Samsung sales 
or profits." Samsung further contends that 
consumers chose Samsung based on a host of 
other factors.  
 
These "causation" arguments, however, 
advocate the same "apportionment" 
requirement that Congress rejected. The 
provisions in the Act of 1887 on design patent 
infringement damages were subsequently 
codified in Section 289 of Title 35.  
 
Section 289 now provides: 
 
“Whoever during the term of a 
patent for a design, without 
license of the owner, (1) applies 
the patented design, or any 
colorable imitation thereof, to any 
article of manufacture for the 
purpose of sale, or (2) sells or 
exposes for sale any article of 
manufacture to which such design 
or colorable imitation has been 
applied shall be liable to the 
owner to the extent of his total 
profit, but not less than $250, 
recoverable in any United States 
district court having jurisdiction 
of the parties. 
 
Nothing in this section shall 
prevent, lessen, or impeach any 
other remedy which an owner of 
an infringed patent has under the 
provisions of this title, but he shall 
not twice recover the profit made 
from the infringement.” 
 
35 U.S.C. § 289. In reciting that an infringer 
"shall be liable to the owner to the extent of 
[the infringer's] total profit," Section 289 
explicitly authorizes the award of total profit 
from the article of manufacture bearing the 
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patented  [1002]  design.1Link to the text of 
the note Several other courts also concluded 
that Section 289 authorizes such award of 
total profit. The clear statutory language 
prevents us from adopting a "causation" rule 
as Samsung urges. 
 
Samsung continues its quest for 
apportionment by arguing, alternatively, that 
the profits awarded should have been limited 
to the infringing "article of manufacture," not 
the entire infringing product. Samsung 
argues for limiting the profits awarded to "the 
portion of the product as sold that 
incorporates or embodies the subject matter 
of the patent." Samsung contends that the 
Second Circuit had "allowed an award of 
infringer's profits from the patented design of 
a piano case but not from the sale of the entire 
piano . . . .” These Second Circuit opinions, 
however, addressed a factual situation where 
"[a] purchaser desiring a piano of a particular 
manufacturer may have the piano placed in 
any one of several cases dealt in by the 
maker." That factual situation occurred in the 
context of the commercial practice in 1915 in 
which ordinary purchasers regarded a piano 
and a piano case as distinct articles of 
manufacture. The facts at hand are different. 
The innards of Samsung's smartphones were 
not sold separately from their shells as 
distinct articles of manufacture to ordinary 
purchasers. We thus do not agree with 
Samsung that these Second Circuit cases 
required the district court to limit the 
damages for design patent infringement in 
this case. 
 
We agree with the district court that there was 
no legal error in the jury instruction on the 
design patent damages. Samsung does not 
argue a lack of substantial evidence to 
support the damages awards under the district 
court's jury instruction. We therefore affirm 
the damages awarded for design patent 
infringements. 
 
III. Utility Patents 
 
Finally, Samsung challenges the validity of 
claim 50 of the ‘163 patent and claim 8 of the 
‘915 patent. Samsung also challenges the 
damages awarded for utility patent 
infringement. 
 
A. Validity 
 
1. Indefiniteness of Claim 50 of the ‘163 
patent 
 
Claim 50 of the ‘163 patent relates to a user 
interface feature in which a user's double 
tapping on a portion of an electronic 
document causes the portion to be enlarged 
and "substantially centered" on the display. 
‘163 patent, claim 50. Samsung contends that 
claim 50 is indefinite because the ‘163 patent 
provides "no objective standard to measure 
the scope of the term 'substantially centered.'"  
 
Samsung's complaint about a lack of an 
"objective standard [of] measure" is seeking 
a level of precision that exceeds the 
definiteness required of valid patents. "The 
definiteness requirement . . . mandates 
clarity, while recognizing that absolute 
precision is unattainable." Given this 
recognition, "a patent is invalid for 
indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the 
specification delineating the patent, and the 
prosecution history, fail to inform, with 
reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art 
about the scope of the invention."  
 
Samsung, however, points to no evidence 
showing that skilled artisans would find the 
61 
 
element "substantially centered" as lacking 
reasonable certainty in its scope. In contrast, 
Apple's expert explained that the "padding" 
allowed in the ‘163 patent provides skilled 
artisans with enough information to 
understand what "substantially centered" 
means in the patent. Apple's expert cites a 
discussion in the specification of an 
embodiment referring to the figure 
reproduced below where the enlarged portion 
of the document is essentially centered 
except for "a predefined amount of padding 
along the sides of the display."  
 
Apple thus presented evidence to show that 
skilled artisans would interpret "substantially 
centered" in the ‘163 patent to mean 
essentially centered except for a marginal 
spacing to accommodate ancillary graphical 
user interface elements. We are not 
persuaded by Samsung's attempt to discredit 
this expert testimony. We therefore agree 
with the district court that Samsung failed to 
carry its burden in challenging the validity of 
claim 50 of the ‘163 patent for indefiniteness. 
 
2. Anticipation of Claim 8 of the ‘915 Patent 
 
Claim 8 of the ‘915 patent describes a 
computer-based method for distinguishing 
between scrolling and gesture (such as 
zooming) operations on a touch screen. 
 
The dispute centers on whether a prior art 
reference, the Nomura patent application, 
taught the "event object" element in claim 8. 
The claim recites "event object" in the 
context such as: "creating an event object in 
response to the user input; determining 
whether the event object invokes a scroll or 
gesture operation . . . ." Samsung contends 
that the "movement history" in Nomura 
inherently disclosed the "event object" in 
claim 8 based on the opinion of its expert.  
Apple, however, rebuts with its own expert 
testimony. Apple's expert explained that 
"event objects" in claim 8 refers to a 
particular "programming construct[]" and 
that there were many potential programming 
alternatives that Nomura could have used to 
implement the "movement history" it 
disclosed. According to the explanation by 
Apple's expert, Nomura did not inherently 
disclose the claimed "event object." We find 
that a reasonable jury could have credited the 
testimony of Apple's expert over Samsung's 
expert. Thus, we agree with the district court 
that there was substantial evidence to support 
the jury's finding that claim 8 of the ‘915 
patent was not anticipated. 
 
B. Damages 
 
Apple advanced at trial both lost profits and 
reasonable royalty damages theories. The 
jury determined that for certain Samsung 
phones found to infringe the ‘915 patent, no 
reasonable non-infringing alternative was 
available, and thus lost profits was an 
appropriate measure of damages. For the 
other Samsung phones found to infringe 
Apple's utility patents-in-suit, the jury 
determined that an award of lost profits was 
not supported, and thus awarded Apple a 
reasonable royalty for Samsung's 
infringement. 
 
1. Lost Profits for Infringement of the ‘915 
Patent 
 
"To recover lost profits, the patent owner 
must show causation in fact, establishing that 
but for the infringement, he would have made 
additional profits." The patentee must "take[] 
into account any alternatives available to the 
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infringer." "[M]arket sales of an acceptable 
noninfringing substitute often suffice alone to 
defeat a case for lost profits."  
 
Samsung argues that lost profits should not 
have been awarded because the evidence 
showed the existence of non-infringing 
substitutes. Specifically, Samsung contends 
that two Samsung phones, found to have not 
infringed the ‘915 patent, should have been 
considered by the jury as non-infringing 
substitutes. Samsung further asserts that 
Apple failed to prove consumer preference of 
the '915 patent's technology over a 
purportedly comparable feature available in 
the two non-infringing Samsung phones. 
 
However, "the '[m]ere existence of a 
competing device does not make that device 
an acceptable substitute.'" The mere 
existence of noninfringing phones is all 
Samsung is relying on to attack the jury's 
verdict. For example, Samsung points to no 
evidence to support its assertion that the two 
noninfringing phones included a feature 
comparable to the one claimed in the '915 
patent. 
 
In contrast, there was substantial evidence to 
support the jury's refusal to consider the two 
phones asserted by Samsung as non-
infringing substitutes. Of these two phones, 
one had significantly different features, such 
as a slide-out physical keyboard in 
combination with a small, low-resolution 
screen. And the other phone was never sold 
by a U.S. carrier. The jury could have 
reasonably found that these two Samsung 
phones were not acceptable alternatives. 
Samsung's unsupported assertion to the 
contrary fails to show a lack of substantial 
evidence supporting the awards of lost 
profits. 
 
2. Reasonable Royalty 
 
Samsung argues that Apple's expert in the 
damages retrial, Ms. Davis, offered only a 
cursory explanation of how she arrived at the 
royalty rates she calculated based on the 
Georgia-Pacific factors. Samsung complains 
specifically about Ms. Davis's testimony that 
the evidence of demand from her lost profits 
analysis was "also relevant to the 
determination of the amount of reasonable 
royalties." 
 
Samsung does not dispute that Ms. Davis 
sufficiently explained her analysis of demand 
in the lost profit context. Samsung is only 
challenging that she did not repeat the same 
information with all of the details in 
testifying about her reasonable royalty 
calculation. However, Ms. Davis expressly 
testified that the demand factor for lost profits 
was also relevant to the determination of a 
reasonable royalty. A reasonable jury could 
refer to Ms. Davis's testimony from an earlier 
context and appropriately weigh the evidence 
in considering Ms. Davis's calculation on the 
royalty rates. Moreover, Ms. Davis's 
testimony included additional substance on 
the Georgia-Pacific factors. For example, 
Ms. Davis expressly considered the cost to 
Samsung of being out of the market long 
enough to design around the patents, the 
profits attributable to Samsung's use of the 
patented technology, and the commercial 
relationship between the parties. Taken as a 
whole, Ms. Davis's testimony provided 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
reasonable royalty awards in the damages 
retrial. 
 
Finally, Samsung complained that Apple's 
expert in the first damages trial, Mr. Musika, 
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failed to explain his Georgia-Pacific analysis 
and identified no evidence supporting his 
royalty rates. Upon Apple's response, 
Samsung acknowledges that Mr. Musika did 
in fact identify and discuss specific Georgia-
Pacific factors and that Mr. Musika referred 
to an exhibit during his testimony. Samsung 
now contends that the analysis was not 
meaningful and the cited exhibit did not 
discuss the Georgia-Pacific's factors at all. 
Samsung's fault-finding is meritless. 
 
We therefore affirm the district court's denial 
of Samsung's motion for judgment as a matter 
of law on the invalidity of claim 50 of the 
‘163 patent and claim 8 of the ‘915 patent, as 
well as the damages awarded for utility patent 
infringement. We also affirm the district 
court's denial of Samsung's motions for a new 
trial on these same issues. We remand for 
immediate entry of final judgment on all 
damages awards not predicated on Apple's 
trade dress claims and for any further 
proceedings necessitated by our decision to 
vacate the jury's verdicts on the unregistered 
and registered trade dress claims. 
 
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-
PART, VACATED-IN-PART and 
REMANDED.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Samsung Appeal on Apple Patent Award”  
The New York Times  
Adam Liptak  
March 21, 2016 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
hear an appeal from Samsung on what it must 
pay Apple for infringing on part of the design 
of the iPhone. In a brief supporting Samsung, 
companies including Google and Facebook 
said the legal framework governing the 
design patents at issue was “out of step with 
modern technology.” 
Samsung, the Korean electronics company, 
argued that design patents, which address 
what products look like, are poorly suited to 
complex devices with many features, adding 
that they can give rise to disproportionate 
penalties. 
Design patents once covered household items 
like spoons and fireplace grates — whose 
design was central to the product — and a 
finding of infringement required the 
defendant to turn over all of its profits. 
Samsung argued that this “total profit rule” 
did not make sense in the digital era and 
would “reward design patents far beyond the 
value of any inventive contribution.” 
“In other words,” the company’s brief said, 
“even if the patented features contributed 1 
percent of the value of Samsung’s phones, 
Apple gets 100 percent of Samsung’s 
profits.” 
Design patents are far less common than 
utility patents, which cover how products 
work. The Supreme Court has not heard a 
design patent case in over a century. 
In December, Samsung agreed to pay Apple 
$548 million in damages in the case, but it 
reserved the right to appeal to the Supreme 
Court. The company now stands to recover as 
much as $399 million of that, representing its 
total profits from various models of phones 
that Apple said, in a lawsuit filed in 2011, 
infringed on its design patents. 
A Samsung spokeswoman, Danielle Meister 
Cohen, said in a statement that the court’s 
review “could lead to a fair interpretation of 
patent law that will support creativity and 
reward innovation.” Apple declined to 
comment. 
The three design elements at issue in the case, 
Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., No. 
15-777, are, in Samsung’s description, “a 
particular black rectangular round-cornered 
front face”; “a substantially similar 
rectangular round-cornered front face plus 
the surrounding rim”; and “a particular 
colorful grid of sixteen icons.” 
In urging the Supreme Court not to hear the 
case, Apple said the justices should not 
reward a copycat. 
“The iPhone’s explosive success was due in 
no small part to its innovative design, which 
included a distinctive front face and a 
colorful graphical user interface — features 
protected by U.S. design patents,” the 
company’s brief said. “The innovation and 
beauty of Apple’s designs were not only 
hailed by consumers and the press, but envied 
by Apple’s fiercest competitor, Samsung, 
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which by its executive’s own admission in 
related litigation is a ‘fast follower’ rather 
than an innovator.” 
The justices agreed to decide only one of the 
questions on which Samsung had sought 
review: “Where a design patent is applied to 
only a component of a product, should an 
award of infringer’s profits be limited to 
those profits attributable to the component?” 
Last year, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, a specialized court 
that handles patent appeals, ruled that the 
governing statute “explicitly authorizes the 
award of total profit from the article of 
manufacture bearing the patented design.” 
The court appeared to acknowledge the 
possibility that “an award of a defendant’s 
entire profits for design patent infringement 
makes no sense in the modern world.” But it 
added that “those are policy arguments that 
should be directed to Congress.” 
“We are bound by what the statute says, 
irrespective of policy arguments that may be 
made against it,” the court said. 
David Opderbeck, a law professor at Seton 
Hall University, said the justices had focused 
on an important issue. 
“The key question is whether damages 
relating to a design patent should be 
apportioned in relation to the value added by 
the patented design or can cover the 
infringer’s entire profit on the infringing 
product,” he said. 
“The Federal Circuit read the design patent 
law very literally and held that the entire 
profits can be recovered,” he added. “In my 
opinion, this is a far too literal reading of the 
statute, particularly because a product’s 
ornamental design very often is not the 
primary driver of consumer demand and of 
the manufacturer’s profits. In some ways, the 
Federal Circuit’s ruling could allow design 
patent law to swallow utility patent law, 
making the ornamental design more 
important than the underlying technology.” 
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“Apple Case against Samsung Should Go Back to the Lower Court: 
Justice Department”  
Reuters 
Dan Levine 
June 9, 2016 
The U.S. Department of Justice asked the 
Supreme Court to overturn an appeals court 
ruling that had favored Apple Inc over 
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd in smartphone 
patent litigation, and asked that it return the 
case to the trial court for more litigation.  
Samsung had appealed a federal appeals 
court ruling to the Supreme Court, which 
agreed to hear the case. The Justice 
Department submitted its view in an amicus 
brief on Wednesday. 
An Apple spokeswoman declined to 
comment, while Samsung told Reuters in a 
statement it welcomes "overwhelming 
support" for overturning the appeals court 
ruling in favour of Apple from various parties 
including the U.S. government.  
"If left uncorrected, the appeals court's ruling 
could lead to diminished innovation, pave the 
way for design troll patent litigation and 
negatively impact the economy and 
consumers," the South Korean firm said.  
The world's top smartphone rivals have been 
feuding over patents since 2011, when Apple 
sued Samsung in Northern California 
alleging infringement of the iPhone's patents, 
designs and trademarked appearance. 
Following a 2012 jury trial, Samsung was 
ordered to pay Apple $930 million. Samsung 
has been trying to reduce that figure ever 
since. 
Its efforts were partially rewarded in May 
2015, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit reversed the trademark 
liability, bringing Samsung's exposure down 
to $548 million. 
The appeals court, however, upheld 
Samsung's infringement of the iPhone's 
patents, including those related to the designs 
of the iPhone's rounded-corner front face, 
bezel and colorful grid of icons. 
Samsung then asked the Supreme Court to 
review the design patent portion of the 
decision, calling the damages awarded 
excessive. In March, the justices agreed to 
look into whether courts should award in 
damages the total profits from a product that 
infringes a design patent, if the patent applies 
only to a component of the product. 
In its amicus brief on Wednesday, the Justice 
Department said it was unclear whether 
Samsung had produced enough evidence to 
support its argument that phone components, 
not the entire phone, should be what matters 
when calculating damages. 
The Supreme Court should send the case 
back for the trial court to determine whether 
a new trial is warranted on that issue, the 
Justice Department said. 
The case is Samsung Electronics Co Ltd et al 
vs. Apple Inc, in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, No. 15-777. 
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“Supreme Court Takes Up Apple v. Samsung, First Design Patent Case 
in a Centurty”  
Ars Technica 
Joe Mullin 
March 21, 2016 
If Apple was finally feeling like it had a solid 
win after getting paid $548 million in patent 
damages by Samsung—well, now it 
shouldn't be so sure. 
The Supreme Court said today that 
it will consider what kind of damages should 
be warranted when a design patent is found 
to be infringed as the court takes up the 
blockbuster Apple v. Samsung case. 
After a 13-day trial in 2012, a jury held that 
Samsung's phones infringed Apple utility 
and design patents. Apple was originally 
granted $1.05 billion, but that number was 
slashed down on appeal. Samsung paid $548 
million late last year, but the company 
didn't give up its right to one last appeal. A 
Supreme Court win could result in Samsung 
getting much of that money back. 
In its petition, Samsung says that the massive 
damage awarded based on three design 
patents is a "ridiculous" result. In Samsung's 
view, the company was ordered to pay 100 
percent of its profits for several phones even 
though there's no doubt that the patented 
designs only made a small contribution. 
"The decision below is thus an open 
invitation to litigation abuse and has already 
prompted grave concern across a range of US 
companies about a new flood of extortionate 
patent litigation, especially in the field of 
high technology," write Samsung lawyers. 
Apple sued over design patents on a black 
rectangular front face with round corners, a 
similar face with a surrounding rim or 
"bezel," and its colorful grid of sixteen icons. 
The patents at issue are D618,677 (shown 
below, a black rectangle with rounded 
corners), D593,087 (with bezel on 
surrounding rim), and D604,305 (colorful 
grid of 16 icons.) 
Samsung's petition was supported by several 
tech companies looking to lessen patent 
damages as well as a brief from Public 
Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation. 
In the tech companies' amicus brief, they 
argue that Section 289 of the Patent Act, 
which dates to the 19th century, only 
envisages awards of an infringer's total 
profits on "relatively simple products." 
"So far as the consumers are concerned, the 
effect of design patent laws that are respected 
is to give them more beautiful carpets and 
wall-papers and oil-cloths," reads the House 
Report on the bill that became Section 289. 
The brief is signed by eight tech giants that 
have found themselves mostly on the 
defensive in patent cases dealing with both 
"patent trolls" and competitors for years: 
Dell, eBay, Facebook, Google, H-P, Newegg, 
Pegasystems, and Vizio. 
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Apple's brief in opposition reviews the 
history of the case below, arguing that 
Samsung is simply dead wrong on the law. 
The company quotes the appeals court that 
found Section 289 "explicitly authorizes the 
award of total profit." It also blasts Samsung 
again as being an egregious copycat and 
patent infringer. 
Samsung's petition "depends on a made-up 
narrative in which Samsung, not Apple, is the 
innovator, despite the 
overwhelming evidence that Samsung copied 
the iPhone’s innovative design," Apple says. 
"Unlike the buttons, knobs, and 
ugly protrusions of prior phones, Apple’s 
iPhone was smooth and elegant and earned 
immediate acclaim," write Apple lawyers. 
"Although Samsung now tries to portray 
itself as an innovator, Samsung 
acknowledged at the time that the iPhone’s 
design was miles ahead of its own." 
Little attention was paid to design patents 
until the blockbuster 2012 trial. The New 
York Times reports that the Supreme Court 
hasn't heard a design patent case in more than 
a century. 
This case doesn't relate to the second Apple v. 
Samsung patent trial, which covered a newer 
generation of Samsung phones. That trial led 
to a $120 million jury verdict in Apple's 
favor, but Apple's win was thrown out 
entirely last month when an appeals court 
invalidated Apple's "slide to unlock" patent 
and two others. 
"We welcome the Court’s decision to hear 
our case," a Samsung spokesperson said in a 
statement earlier today. "The Court’s review 
of this case can lead to a fair interpretation of 
patent law that will support creativity and 
reward innovation." 
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“Court will reduce Apple's $930 million win in Samsung patent case”  
The Verge 
Adi Robertson 
May 18, 2015
Apple and Samsung's patent infringement 
battle isn't over, and in the latest ruling, 
neither side has gotten exactly what it 
wanted. In a filing posted today, the US 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed that Samsung had copied specific 
design patents in Apple's iPhone. But the 
court decided that Samsung wasn't infringing 
on Apple's overall trade dress — the look and 
feel of its phones. This means that while the 
damages Apple was granted for patent 
infringement will stand, the company's 
overall $930 million award will be 
downsized. 
The court's analysis hinged on the idea that 
trade dress had to be based on aesthetic 
decisions meant to make something visually 
distinctive, and that rules protecting it have to 
be balanced with "a fundamental right to 
compete through imitation of a competitor’s 
product." While Apple argued that the 
iPhone's rounded rectangle shape and rows of 
square apps were designed to give it a 
particular look that fit Apple's brand, the 
court cited Apple's previous claims that the 
shape was also easier to use. The same went 
for its app icons, which were attractive but 
also meant to make the iPhone more intuitive. 
The current legal fight between Samsung and 
Apple has been going on since 2011, when 
Apple alleged that several Samsung phones 
infringed on design and utility patents for its 
iPhone. In 2012, a court found that Samsung 
had indeed infringed on Apple's patents for 
"bounce-back" scrolling, multitouch 
gestures, and tap-to-zoom options on iOS. It 
also found that Samsung's phones had 
infringed on both officially registered and 
unregistered iPhone trade dress. Apple had 
requested $2.5 billion in damages, and it 
ended up getting slightly over $1 billion. 
Since then, Samsung and Apple have both 
been trying to tilt the ruling and the damages 
in their favor. Apple tried and failed to get a 
sales ban on the infringing phones and tablets 
(all of which have now been obsolete for 
several years), and it requested an additional 
$707 million from Samsung. It got neither of 
these; in fact, its original damages were 
recalculated and slightly cut back. Now that 
the earlier decision has been struck down, 
lower courts will have to calculate a new 
damages number. Samsung, however, has 
also had its share of disappointment. It lost a 
second patent battle to Apple in 2014, for the 
smaller amount of around $120 million. And 
this latest ruling reaffirms that it infringed on 
Apple's patents, so it's still going to be paying 
out in this case — just not as much as 
originally expected. 
Apple, for its part, is optimistic about the 
decision. "We are pleased the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeal confirmed Samsung 
blatantly copied Apple products," said a 
spokesperson on the news. "This is a victory 
for design and those who respect it. Even 
though Samsung must pay for its widespread 
infringement of our patents, this case has 
always been about more than money. It’s 
about innovation and the hard work that goes 
into inventing products that people love, 
which is hard to put a price on." 
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And, of course, so is Samsung. "We welcome 
the US Court of Appeals' ruling overturning 
Apple's infringement and damage claims 
against Samsung over trade dress," its 
spokesperson said. "Today's decision shows 
that Apple's claims over trade dress and 
damages lack merit and are grossly 
exaggerated. We remain confident that our 
products do not infringe on Apple’s design 
patents and other intellectual property, and 
we will continue to take all appropriate 
measures to protect our products." 
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Salman v. US 
15-8049 
Ruling Below: United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015) 
Salman was accused of insider trading, having been tipped off by his brother-in-law (Maher 
Kara) via his brother-in-law’s brother (Michael Kara). While no traditional gifts or transactions 
of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature were made, the Government showed evidence that the 
tippee (Michael) and tipper (Maher) had a mutually beneficial and fulfilling familial relationship, 
which Salman was aware of, and claimed that this was sufficient to meet the standard set in 
Dirks v. S.E.C. 
Salman was found guilty of four counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud. Salman subsequently appealed, claiming that a new standard set by 
United States v. Newman from the Second Circuit should be applied. On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision on the grounds that the familial relationship 
presented sufficient evidence. 
Question Presented: Whether the insider trading rule in Dirks v. SEC requires proof of “an 
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary 
or similarly valuable nature,” as in United States v. Newman, or whether a close family 
relationship between the tipper and tippee is sufficient. 
 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, 
v. 
Bassam Yacoub SALMAN, aka Bessam Jacob Salman, Defendant–Appellant. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Decided on July 6, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
Defendant–Appellant Bassam Yacoub 
Salman appeals his conviction, following 
jury trial, for conspiracy and insider trading. 
He argues that the evidence was insufficient 
to sustain his conviction under the standard 
announced by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Newman, which he urges us to 
adopt. We find that the evidence was 
sufficient, and we affirm. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
This case arises from an insider-trading 
scheme involving members of Salman's 
extended family. On September 1, 2011, 
Salman was indicted for one count of 
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conspiracy to commit securities fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and four counts 
of securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b–5, 
240.10b5–1 and 240.10b5–2, and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2. At trial, the Government presented 
evidence of the following: 
 
In 2002, Salman's future brother-in-law 
Maher Kara joined Citigroup's healthcare 
investment banking group. Over the next few 
years, Maher began to discuss aspects of his 
job with his older brother, Mounir 
(“Michael”) Kara. At first, Maher sought 
help from Michael, who held an 
undergraduate degree in chemistry, in 
understanding scientific concepts relevant to 
his work in the healthcare and biotechnology 
sectors. In 2004, when their father was dying 
of cancer, the focus of the brothers' 
discussions shifted to companies that were 
active in the areas of oncology and pain 
management. Maher began to suspect that 
Michael was trading on the information they 
discussed, although Michael initially denied 
it. As time wore on, Michael became more 
brazen and more persistent in his requests for 
inside information, and Maher knowingly 
obliged. From late 2004 through early 2007, 
Maher regularly disclosed to Michael 
information about upcoming mergers and 
acquisitions of and by Citigroup clients. 
 
Meanwhile, in 2003, Maher Kara became 
engaged to Salman's sister, Saswan (“Suzie”) 
Salman. Over the course of the engagement, 
the Kara family and the Salman family grew 
close. In particular, Salman and Michael 
Kara became fast friends. In the fall of 2004, 
Michael began to share with Salman the 
inside information that he had learned from 
Maher, encouraging Salman to “mirror-imag 
[e]” his trading activity. Rather than trade 
through his own brokerage account, however, 
Salman arranged to deposit money, via a 
series of transfers through other accounts, 
into a brokerage account held jointly in the 
name of his wife's sister and her husband, 
Karim Bayyouk. Salman then shared the 
inside information with Bayyouk and the two 
split the profits from Bayyouk's trading. The 
brokerage records introduced at trial revealed 
that, on numerous occasions from 2004 to 
2007, Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed 
nearly identical trades in securities issued by 
Citigroup clients shortly before the 
announcement of major transactions. As a 
result of these trades, Salman and Bayyouk's 
account grew from $396,000 to 
approximately $2.1 million. 
 
Of particular relevance here, the Government 
presented evidence that Salman knew full 
well that Maher Kara was the source of the 
information. Michael Kara (who pled guilty 
and testified for the Government) testified 
that, early in the scheme, Salman asked 
where the information was coming from, and 
Michael told him, directly, that it came from 
Maher. Michael further testified about an 
incident that occurred around the time of 
Maher and Suzie's wedding in 2005. 
According to Michael Kara, on that visit, 
Michael noticed that there were many papers 
relating to their stock trading strewn about 
Salman's office. Michael became angry and 
admonished Salman that he had to be careful 
with the information because it was coming 
from Maher. Michael testified that Salman 
agreed that they had to “protect” Maher and 
promised to shred all of the papers. 
 
The Government further presented evidence 
that Maher and Michael Kara enjoyed a close 
and mutually beneficial relationship. 
Specifically, the jury heard testimony that 
Michael helped pay for Maher's college, that 
he stood in for their deceased father at 
Maher's wedding, and, as discussed above, 
that Michael coached Maher in basic science 
to help him succeed at his job. Maher, for his 
part, testified that he “love[d] [his] brother 
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very much” and that he gave Michael the 
inside information in order to “benefit him” 
and to “fulfill [ ] whatever needs he had.” For 
example, Maher testified that on one 
occasion, he received a call from Michael 
asking for a “favor,” requesting 
“information,” and explaining that he 
“owe[d] somebody.” After Michael turned 
down Maher's offer of money, Maher gave 
him a tip about an upcoming acquisition 
instead. 
 
Finally, the Government presented evidence 
that Salman was aware of the Kara brothers' 
close fraternal relationship. The Salmans and 
the Karas were tightly knit families, and 
Salman would have had ample opportunity to 
observe Michael and Maher's interactions at 
their regular family gatherings. For example, 
Michael gave a toast at Maher's wedding, 
which Salman attended, in which Michael 
described how he spoke to his younger 
brother nearly every day and described 
Maher as his “mentor,” his “private counsel,” 
and “one of the most generous human beings 
he knows.” Maher, overcome with emotion, 
began to weep. 
 
The jury found Salman guilty on all five 
counts. Salman then moved for a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, on the ground, inter alia, 
that there was no evidence that he knew that 
the tipper disclosed confidential information 
in exchange for a personal benefit. The 
district court denied his motion in full. 
Salman timely appealed, but did not raise a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
in his opening brief. After he filed his reply 
brief, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, in United States v. 
Newman, vacated the insider-trading 
convictions of two individuals on the ground 
that the Government failed to present 
sufficient evidence that they knew the 
information they received had been disclosed 
in breach of a fiduciary duty. After the 
Second Circuit denied the Government's 
petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en 
banc, Salman promptly moved for leave to 
file a supplemental brief arguing that the 
Government's evidence in the instant case 
was insufficient under the standard 
announced in Newman, which he urged this 
Court to adopt. We granted Salman's motion 
and gave the Government an opportunity to 
respond. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
The threshold question is whether Salman 
waived the present argument by failing to 
raise it in his opening brief on this appeal, 
even though he had raised it below and, after 
Newman was decided, promptly raised it in a 
supplemental brief that the Government 
responded to before oral argument. 
Ordinarily, we will not consider “ ‘matters on 
appeal that are not specifically and distinctly 
argued in appellant's opening brief.’ ”  
 
However, we make an exception to this 
general rule (1) for “good cause shown” or “if 
a failure to do so would result in manifest 
injustice,” (2) “when it is raised in the 
appellee's brief,” or (3) “if the failure to raise 
the issue properly did not prejudice the 
defense of the opposing party.”  
 
The third exception applies here. As both 
parties have had a full opportunity to brief 
this issue and to address it at oral argument, 
the Government cannot complain of 
prejudice. Accordingly, we address Salman's 
claim on the merits. 
 
B. 
 
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence, we must determine whether, 
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when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the Government, the evidence was “ 
‘adequate to allow any rational trier of fact to 
find the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Salman urges 
us to adopt Newman as the law of this Circuit, 
and contends that, under Newman, the 
evidence was insufficient to find either that 
Maher Kara disclosed the information to 
Michael Kara in exchange for a personal 
benefit, or, if he did, that Salman knew of 
such benefit. 
 
The “personal benefit” requirement for tippee 
liability derives from the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Dirks v. S.E.C. Dirks presented an 
unusual fact pattern. Ronald Secrist, a 
whistleblower at a company called Equity 
Funding, had contacted Raymond Dirks, a 
well-known securities analyst, after Secrist's 
prior disclosures to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) had gone for 
naught. Secrist, for no other purpose than 
exposing the Equity Funding fraud, disclosed 
inside information about the company to 
Dirks, who in turn launched his own 
investigation that eventually led to public 
exposure of a massive fraud. However, in the 
process of his investigation, Dirks openly 
discussed the information provided by Secrist 
with various clients and investors, some of 
whom then sold their Equity Funding stock 
on the basis of that information. Upon 
learning this, the SEC charged Dirks with 
securities fraud, and this position was upheld 
by an SEC Administrative Law Judge and 
affirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit, 
after which certiorari was granted.  
When the case came to the Supreme Court, 
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, began 
by noting that, whistleblowing quite aside, 
corporate insiders, in the many conversations 
they typically have with stock analysts, often 
accidentally or mistakenly disclose material 
information that is not immediately available 
to the public. Thus, “[i]mposing a duty to 
disclose or abstain solely because a person 
knowingly receives material nonpublic 
information from an insider and trades on it 
could have an inhibiting influence on the role 
of market analysts, which the SEC itself 
recognizes is necessary to the preservation of 
a healthy market.” At the same time, the 
Court continued, “[t]he need for a ban on 
some tippee trading is clear. Not only are 
insiders forbidden by their fiduciary 
relationship from personally using 
undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they may not give such 
information to an outsider for the same 
improper purpose of exploiting the 
information for their personal gain.”  
 
“Thus, the test is whether the insider 
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, 
from his disclosure,” for in that case the 
insider is breaching his fiduciary duty to the 
company's shareholders not to exploit 
company information for his personal 
benefit. And a tippee is equally liable if “the 
tippee knows or should know that there has 
been [such] a breach,” i.e., knows of the 
personal benefit. 
 
Of particular importance here, the Court then 
went on to define what constitutes the 
“personal benefit” that constitutes the breach 
of fiduciary duty. It would include, for 
example, “a pecuniary gain or a reputational 
benefit that will translate into future 
earnings.” However, “[t]he elements of 
fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic 
information also exist when an insider makes 
a gift of confidential information to a trading 
relative or friend.”  
 
The last-quoted holding of Dirks governs this 
case. Maher's disclosure of confidential 
information to Michael, knowing that he 
intended to trade on it, was precisely the “gift 
of confidential information to a trading 
relative” that Dirks envisioned. Indeed, 
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Maher himself testified that, by providing 
Michael with inside information, he intended 
to “benefit” his brother and to “fulfill[ ] 
whatever needs he had.” As to Salman's 
knowledge, Michael Kara, whose testimony 
we must credit on a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, testified that he 
directly told Salman that it was Michael's 
brother Maher who was, repeatedly, leaking 
the inside information that Michael then 
conveyed to Salman, and that Salman later 
agreed that they had to “protect” Maher from 
exposure. Given the Kara brothers' close 
relationship, Salman could readily have 
inferred Maher's intent to benefit Michael. 
Thus, there can be no question that, under 
Dirks, the evidence was sufficient for the jury 
to find that Maher disclosed the information 
in breach of his fiduciary duties and that 
Salman knew as much. 
 
Salman, however, argues that the Second 
Circuit in Newman interpreted Dirks to 
require more than this. Of course, Newman is 
not binding on us, and our own reading of 
Dirks is guided by the clearly applicable 
language italicized above. But we would not 
lightly ignore the most recent ruling of our 
sister circuit in an area of law that it has 
frequently encountered. 
 
The defendants in Newman, Todd Newman 
and Anthony Chiasson, both portfolio 
managers, were charged with trading on 
material non-public information regarding 
two companies, Dell and NVIDIA, obtained 
by a group of analysts at various hedge funds 
and investment firms. The information came 
to them via two distinct tipping chains. The 
Dell tipping chain originated with Rob Ray, 
a member of Dell's investor relations 
department. Ray tipped information 
regarding Dell's earnings numbers to Sandy 
Goyal, an analyst. Goyal, in turn, relayed the 
information to Jesse Tortora, another analyst, 
who relayed it to his manager, Newman, as 
well as to other analysts including Spyridon 
Adondakis, who passed it to Chiasson. The 
NVIDIA tipping chain began with Chris 
Choi, of NVIDIA's finance unit, who tipped 
inside information to his acquaintance Hyung 
Lim, who passed it to Danny Kuo, an analyst, 
who circulated it to his analyst friends, 
including Tortora and Adondakis, who in 
turn gave it to Newman and Chiasson. 
 
Having received this information, Newman 
and Chiasson executed trades in both Dell 
and NVIDIA stock, generating lavish profits 
for their respective funds. 
 
The Government presented the following 
evidence regarding the relationships between 
the Dell and NVIDIA insiders and their 
respective tippees. The Dell tipper and 
tippee, Ray and Goyal, attended business 
school together and had been colleagues at 
Dell, but were not “close.” Goyal provided 
career advice and assistance to Ray, for 
example, discussing the qualifying 
examination required to become an analyst 
and editing his résumé. This advice began 
before Ray started to give Goyal information, 
and Goyal testified that he would have given 
it as a routine professional courtesy without 
receiving anything in return. As to the 
NVIDIA tips, the insider, Choi, and his 
tippee, Lim, were “family friends” who met 
through church and occasionally socialized 
with one another. Lim testified that he did not 
provide anything of value to Choi in return 
for the tips, and that Choi did not know that 
he was trading in NVIDIA stock.  
 
The Second Circuit held that this evidence 
was insufficient to establish that either Ray or 
Choi received a personal benefit in exchange 
for the tip. It noted that, although the 
“personal benefit” standard is “permissive,” 
it “does not suggest that the Government may 
prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the 
mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a 
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casual or social nature.” Instead, to the extent 
that “a personal benefit may be inferred from 
a personal relationship between the tipper 
and tippee, ... such an inference is 
impermissible in the absence of proof of a 
meaningfully close personal relationship that 
generates an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature.”  
 
Applying these standards, the court 
concluded that the “circumstantial evidence 
... was simply too thin to warrant the 
inference that the corporate insiders received 
any personal benefit in exchange for their 
tips,” and furthermore, that “the Government 
presented absolutely no testimony or any 
other evidence that Newman and Chiasson 
knew they were trading on information 
obtained from insiders, or that those insiders 
received any benefit in exchange for such 
disclosures.” 
 
Salman reads Newman to hold that evidence 
of a friendship or familial relationship 
between tipper and tippee, standing alone, is 
insufficient to demonstrate that the tipper 
received a benefit. In particular, he focuses 
on the language indicating that the exchange 
of information must include “at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature,” which he reads as referring 
to the benefit received by the tipper. Salman 
argues that because there is no evidence that 
Maher received any such tangible benefit in 
exchange for the inside information, or that 
Salman knew of any such benefit, the 
Government failed to carry its burden. 
 
To the extent Newman can be read to go so 
far, we decline to follow it. Doing so would 
require us to depart from the clear holding of 
Dirks that the element of breach of fiduciary 
duty is met where an “insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative 
or friend.” Indeed, Newman itself recognized 
that the “ ‘personal benefit is broadly defined 
to include not only pecuniary gain, but also, 
inter alia, ... the benefit one would obtain 
from simply making a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend.’ ”  
 
In our case, the Government presented direct 
evidence that the disclosure was intended as 
a gift of market-sensitive information. 
Specifically, Maher Kara testified that he 
disclosed the material nonpublic information 
for the purpose of benefitting and providing 
for his brother Michael. Thus, the evidence 
that Maher Kara breached his fiduciary duties 
could not have been more clear, and the fact 
that the disclosed information was market-
sensitive—and therefore within the reach of 
the securities laws, was obvious on its face. If 
Salman's theory were accepted and this 
evidence found to be insufficient, then a 
corporate insider or other person in 
possession of confidential and proprietary 
information would be free to disclose that 
information to her relatives, and they would 
be free to trade on it, provided only that she 
asked for no tangible compensation in return. 
Proof that the insider disclosed material 
nonpublic information with the intent to 
benefit a trading relative or friend is 
sufficient to establish the breach of fiduciary 
duty element of insider trading. 
 
In Salman's case, the jury had more than 
enough facts, as described above, to infer that 
when Maher Kara gave inside information to 
Michael Kara, he knew that there was a 
potential (indeed, a virtual certainty) that 
Michael would trade on it. And while Salman 
may not have been aware of all the details of 
the Kara brothers' relationship, the jury could 
easily have found that, as a close friend and 
member (through marriage) of the close-knit 
Kara clan, Salman must have known that, 
when Maher gave confidential information to 
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Michael, he did so with the “intention to 
benefit” a close relative. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the evidence was 
more than sufficient for a rational jury to find 
both that the inside information was 
disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty, and 
that Salman knew of that breach at the time 
he traded on it. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
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“An Insider Trading Case Heads to the Supreme Court” 
 
The New York Times 
Peter J. Henning 
January 20, 2016 
 
The Justice Department got its wish on 
Tuesday, at least in a backhanded way, when 
the Supreme Court unexpectedly granted 
review of an insider trading conviction. 
After rejecting the government’s request to 
review the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Newman in October, which 
overturned two convictions for insider 
trading, the Supreme Court decided to review 
a decision by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. Salman that upheld a conviction for trading 
on inside information. 
Even though Justice Department lost a 
number of convictions as a result of the 
decision in the Newman case, the Salman 
case may be a better vehicle for the 
department to argue that the justices should 
take a broad view of the circumstances that 
will support finding that providing inside 
information was illegal. 
To prove an act of tipping is illegal, the 
Supreme Court stated in 1983 in Dirks v. 
S.E.C., “the test is whether the insider 
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, 
from his disclosure.” That benefit can be 
tangible, like money or services, or “when an 
insider makes a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend.” 
In the Newman case, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned 
the convictions of two hedge fund managers, 
Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, who 
received corporate earnings information 
through a chain of analysts, never dealing 
directly with the insiders who made the 
disclosures. The appeals court found that the 
jury instructions failed to require a finding 
that the defendants knew a benefit was passed 
between the recipients, called the tippees, and 
their tippers. 
In reaching that result, the appeals court also 
explained that when the violation is based on 
friendship between tipper and tippee, then the 
government must show “a meaningfully 
close personal relationship that generates an 
exchange that is objective, consequential, and 
represents at least a potential gain of a 
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” 
That language drew the ire of the Justice 
Department, which asked the Supreme Court 
to review the decision. A brief filed by 
Donald B. Verrilli Jr., the solicitor general, 
argued that the Newman decision effectively 
rewrote the requirements in the Dirks case for 
proving tipping. 
If the case was not overturned, he wrote, it 
would “hurt market participants, 
disadvantage scrupulous market analysts, and 
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impair the government’s ability to protect the 
fairness and integrity of the securities 
markets.” 
The Supreme Court rejected the 
government’s petition, leaving the appeals 
court’s decision undisturbed. 
It is unclear whether the concerns expressed 
about the potential impact of the Newman 
case were well founded. Just last week, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the conspiracy and 
securities fraud convictions of David Riley, 
the former chief information officer at 
Foundry Networks, for giving information to 
Matthew G. Teeple, an adviser to a hedge 
fund, about the impending acquisition of the 
company by Brocade Communications. 
Their relationship was based on friendship, 
much like in the Newman case, but the 
government’s evidence went further than just 
casual social interactions between them. Mr. 
Teeple gave Mr. Riley investment advice, 
assisted in his search for a job and advised an 
angel investment group Mr. Riley had put 
together with other former Foundry 
executives. The appeals court found this 
sufficient to establish the passing of an 
“immediately pecuniary tangible benefit” 
between them, meeting the requirement of 
the decisions in the Newman and Dirks cases 
for a violation. 
The Justice Department and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission may well have 
made their peace with the Newman case, and 
the result in Mr. Riley’s case gave some 
comfort that the law would not take a strong 
turn against the government. But just days 
later came the Supreme Court’s 
announcement that it would review the 
Salman case to consider what the Dirks case 
requires for proving insider trading, calling 
into question whether the justices might raise 
the bar for proving liability for tipping. 
In that case, Maher F. Kara, a former 
investment banker at Citigroup, disclosed 
information about health care deals to his 
older brother, Michael. The brothers were 
part of a close family and spoke with each 
other nearly every day. Maher Kara testified 
that he gave his brother the information to 
“benefit him” and “fulfill whatever needs he 
had.” 
Bassam Yacoub Salman, in turn, started 
receiving inside information through 
Michael, whom Mr. Salman knew because 
his sister had become Maher Kara’s fiancée. 
Mr. Salman was convicted of trading on the 
confidential information that Maher Kara 
took from Citigroup, making a profit of about 
$1.7 million. No money ever changed hands 
in exchange for the information, and the 
benefits were of the type usually seen in that 
situation: love and affection. 
In an interesting twist, the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 
written by Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Federal 
District Court for the Southern District in 
Manhattan, who has presided over a number 
of insider trading cases and was sitting on the 
appeals court by designation. Although he 
would normally be bound by the decision in 
the Newman case in a matter in his own 
courtroom, he was not required to follow it 
when a different appeals court reviewed a 
conviction. 
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The appeals court rejected Mr. Salman’s 
argument that the Newman case required 
showing a tangible benefit beyond the close 
familial relationship. “To the extent Newman 
can be read to go so far, we decline to follow 
it,” Judge Rakoff wrote. Instead, the opinion 
concluded there was sufficient evidence that 
the information “was intended as a gift” to 
meet the requirements of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in the Dirks case. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
did not specifically disagree with the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, but it took a 
more forgiving approach to what is necessary 
to show a benefit in a tipping case. 
Does that mean there is a conflict between the 
appellate courts that the Supreme Court 
needs to resolve? 
The Justice Department pointed to the 
conflicting approaches as a reason for the 
Supreme Court to review the Newman case, 
asking the justices “to restore a uniform 
interpretation of Dirks.” But in opposing Mr. 
Salman’s petition for review, the government 
argued that “review is less warranted here 
than in Newman because the decision that 
petitioner urges this court to review is correct 
and wholly consistent with Dirks.” 
In other words, the Justice Department 
essentially claimed that after refusing to 
review the Newman case, the Supreme Court 
should just let sleeping dogs lie. That did not 
persuade the justices, however, especially as 
the Salman case squarely presents the 
question about how much evidence is needed 
to prove a benefit when it is based on 
friendship or family, not something tangible. 
Although the Justice Department might have 
preferred to have the Newman case reviewed, 
the facts underlying Mr. Salman’s conviction 
may give the government a better opportunity 
to ask the Supreme Court to uphold the 
conviction. As an initial matter, the jury has 
already found the evidence sufficient to show 
a benefit, so the justices may not want to 
substitute their judgment for that of the 
jurors. 
Mr. Newman and Mr. Chiasson were far 
removed from the original sources of the 
inside information, who were never charged 
for their disclosure. That made it difficult to 
fathom how a tippee could be liable when the 
tipper did not rate being accused of violating 
the law. Thus, it was not difficult to see why 
the appeals court found that the government’s 
evidence “was simply too thin to warrant the 
inference that the corporate insiders received 
any personal benefit in exchange for their 
tips.” 
In Mr. Salman’s case, on the other hand, there 
was a close-knit family along with testimony 
from Maher Kara, the tipper, that he intended 
to benefit his brother Michael by dispensing 
highly sensitive deal information. Although 
earnings projections are passed around with 
regularity among analysts, information about 
deals is highly valuable and clearly 
confidential, so showing that a tippee knew 
about a benefit when it comes through family 
ties might be closer to what the Supreme 
Court has already said is a violation in the 
Dirks case. 
Judge Rakoff pointed out that if the evidence 
of the benefit in Mr. Salman’s case was 
insufficient, “then a corporate insider or other 
person in possession of confidential and 
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proprietary information would be free to 
disclose that information to her relatives, and 
they would be free to trade on it, provided 
only that she asked for no tangible 
compensation in return.” 
Don’t be surprised to see the Justice 
Department quote this line as the primary 
basis for asking the Supreme Court to uphold 
the conviction and not impose more onerous 
requirements for proving that tipping 
confidential information is a violation. So 
although the government did not get what it 
wanted in the Newman case, it may get the 
result it desires – a broad reading of liability 
for tipping inside information – in the Salman 
case.
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“Supreme Court Decides To Weigh In On Insider Trading” 
 
Forbes 
Michael Bobelian 
January 20, 2016 
 
Months after turning down the Department of 
Justice’s request to review an appeal of an 
insider trading case, the Supreme Court 
yesterday agreed to hear a different insider 
trading case that has split the nation’s 
appellate courts. 
The case in question, Salman v. United 
States, comes from a Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals case from last year that applied a less 
stringent legal standard than the one 
employed by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 2014. 
It is typical for the Supreme Court to weigh 
in on circuit splits where federal appellate 
courts from across the country apply or 
interpret laws differently. What’s at stake in 
this case is whether the justices will approve 
the Ninth Circuit’s methodology, and thereby 
make it easier for prosecutors to pursue 
certain types of insider trading claims. 
In U.S. v. Salman, the Ninth Circuit had to 
determine whether the defendant’s actions 
met the standards set out by the Supreme 
Court in Dirks v. S.E.C., a seminal opinion 
issued in 1983. 
Insider trading is largely a product of judicial 
decisions rather than federal statutes. As a 
result, the nation’s federal appellate courts 
have used Dirks as their guide over the years. 
The appeal arose over Dirks‘s requirement 
that an original tipper – the first person to 
share confidential information – gain either 
“directly or indirectly” from an insider 
trading transaction. 
Under Dirks, tippees – the people who 
receive and trade on confidential information 
– can only be found guilty of insider trading 
if they know that the tippers received some 
“personal benefit” for passing on the illicit 
information. This standard applies to tippees 
even if they are two or more steps removed 
from the original tipper. 
In Salman, the defendant, Bassam Yacoub 
Salman, received confidential information 
about potential health care deals from 
Michael Kara, who had received it from his 
brother Maher Kara, designating Maher as a 
downstream tippee in insider trading 
parlance. 
Salman traded on the information for a profit 
of little more than $1.7 million but never paid 
Maher for the information. 
The question for the Ninth Circuit was 
whether Maher saw some direct or indirect 
gain from the information he had divulged to 
his brother and whether Salman knew of this 
personal benefit. 
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The court found that Maher had indeed 
received an intangible benefit by helping his 
brother, with whom he was very close, 
financially through the exchange of 
confidential information and that Salman, 
who became Maher’s brother-in-law, knew 
of the benefits Maher derived from these 
exchanges. 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling sharply differed 
from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which oversees the largest number of insider 
trading cases because of its location in New 
York. 
In late 2014, the Second Circuit overturned 
the convictions of Todd Newman and 
Anthony Chiasson, two hedge fund portfolio 
managers who were found guilty of trading 
on confidential information they had received 
through second-hand sources rather than 
original tippers. In U.S. v. Newman, the 
Second Circuit had to determine whether the 
links between Newman and Chiasson and the 
original tippers were too inconsequential and 
whether the defendants knew of any tangible 
benefits accorded to these tippers for their 
transmission of insider information. 
“First, the Government’s evidence of any 
personal benefit received by the alleged 
insiders was insufficient to establish the 
tipper liability from which defendants’ 
purported tippee liability would derive,” 
Judge Barrington Parker wrote for the 
appellate panel. “Second,… the Government 
presented no evidence that Newman and 
Chiasson knew that they were trading on 
information obtained from insiders in 
violation of those insiders’ fiduciary duties.” 
Newman made it much more difficult to 
pursue downstream tippees by requiring 
more direct connections between the original 
tippers and those that ultimately profited 
from the confidential information. It also 
declared that mere friendships or other close 
relationships are not enough to constitute the 
personal benefit requirement posed in Dirks. 
Weeks after the Supreme Court declined to 
hear the government’s appeal in the Newman 
case last October, Preet Bharara, the U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York, dropped insider trading charges against 
seven defendants. “These prosecutions were 
all undertaken in good faith reliance on what 
this Office and others, including able defense 
counsel for all those who pled guilty, 
understood to be the well-settled law before 
Newman,” Bharara said when announcing the 
move. 
When the government filed an appeal to the 
Supreme Court, it warned that if Newman 
was “allowed to stand, the court of appeals’ 
novel… standard will restrict enforcement 
of… insider trading.” 
In Salman, the Ninth Circuit sided with the 
Department of Justice. Following the Second 
Circuit’s approach, the Ninth Circuit 
declared would “require us to depart from the 
clear holding of Dirks that the element of 
breach of fiduciary duty is met where an 
‘insider makes a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend.’” 
The facts in the two cases were not identical, 
leaving the Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to borrow from both circuit 
rulings in arriving at its decision. The justices 
are set to hear the case later in this term.
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“Judge Rakoff Ruling on Tips May Help Prosecution on Insider Trading 
Cases” 
 
The New York Times 
Peter J. Henning 
July 7, 2015 
 
Insider trading cases based on the passing of 
tips seemed endangered after a decision by 
the federal appeals court in Manhattan in 
December. 
The case, United States v. Newman, decided 
at the end of 2014, reversed the convictions 
of two hedge fund managers for insider 
trading. The ruling also troubled prosecutors 
and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, by making it more difficult to 
prove a violation by requiring proof that a 
tipper received a tangible benefit in exchange 
for providing inside information. 
It seemed as if all prominent defendants 
convicted of insider trading, like Raj 
Rajaratnam and Mathew Martoma, were 
asking to have their convictions overturned 
because of the Newman opinion. 
But a decision from the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in California 
has taken some of the bite out of the Newman 
decision. That ruling adopts a more favorable 
standard for proving a violation when inside 
information is passed among family 
members. 
And in a fascinating twist, the author of the 
opinion is Jed S. Rakoff, a United States 
District Court judge in Manhattan, who had 
earlier expressed concern with the Newman 
decision. 
The Newman case involved two hedge fund 
managers — Todd Newman and Anthony R. 
Chiasson — who were tried together. They 
were at the end of a chain of analysts who 
were passing along information about 
impending corporate earnings 
announcements, and earning handsome 
profits by trading ahead of the disclosures. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reversed their convictions, 
saying that the trial judge had not instructed 
the jury that it had to find that the defendants 
knew the original source of the information 
had received a benefit from tipping off others. 
The real problem for the government came in 
a short discussion about what evidence was 
needed to establish that the tipper had 
received an impermissible benefit. The 
Newman opinion asserted that it must involve 
something more than a casual friendship 
between the tipper and tippee. 
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As the court wrote, there must be proof of a 
“meaningfully close personal relationship” in 
which there was “an exchange that is 
objective, consequential, and represents at 
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature.” 
The appeals court didn’t explain exactly what 
that meant, leaving an opening for defendants 
like Mr. Rajaratnam and Mr. Martoma to 
argue that the government’s proof was 
insufficient. 
The Justice Department asked the appeals 
court to reconsider, a request rejected in 
April. Prosecutors are considering whether to 
seek Supreme Court review. 
United States v. Salman, which was heard 
before the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, took a more favorable view 
of what the government has to prove in a 
tipping case. 
In that case, Maher F. Kara, a former 
investment banker at Citigroup, provided 
information about health care deals to his 
older brother, Michael, who traded on it. The 
brothers were part of a very close family, 
speaking with each other nearly every day. 
Maher Kara testified that he gave his brother 
the information to “benefit him” and “fulfill 
whatever needs he had.” 
Bassam Yacoub Salman, in turn, started 
receiving the inside information through 
Michael (Mr. Salman knew the family 
because his sister had become Maher Kara’s 
fiancée). Mr. Salman was convicted of 
trading on the confidential information that 
Maher Kara took from Citigroup. No money 
ever changed hands, and the benefits Mr. 
Kara received from Michael were of the type 
usually exchanged between family members: 
love and affection. 
The Newman opinion came out while Mr. 
Salman’s case was before the Ninth Circuit. 
Mr. Salman argued that the Second Circuit’s 
decision should be applied to his case, 
asserting that the government did not 
introduce sufficient evidence that a tangible 
benefit had been received by Maher Kara. 
Judge Rakoff was assigned to the three-judge 
panel hearing Mr. Salman’s appeal under a 
statute that authorizes federal district judges 
to sit on an appeals court “whenever the 
business of that court so requires.” Judges are 
assigned randomly to cases, so it was the luck 
of the draw that put him on yet another 
closely watched insider trading case. 
This is not the first time Judge Rakoff has 
considered the scope of the Newman 
decision. In S.E.C. v. Payton, decided in 
April, he rejected the argument of two 
defendants who were friends and had sought 
to dismiss insider trading charges because the 
S.E.C. had not identified a sufficient benefit 
being given in exchange for the information. 
Judge Rakoff expressed some unease with 
the Newman opinion when he wrote that the 
appeals court’s conclusion about what 
constitutes a benefit “may not be obvious.” 
He added that the opinion’s interpretation of 
the law did not make it “easy for a lower 
court” to conform with the Supreme Court 
decision in Dirks v. S.E.C. that established 
the benefits test. 
In Dirks, decided in 1983, the Supreme Court 
said that the benefit to the tipper may be 
tangible, but can “also exist when an insider 
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makes a gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend.” 
Judge Rakoff found that the S.E.C. complaint 
included enough detail about potential 
benefits exchanged between the defendants, 
so the insider case could move forward. 
A federal district court must follow the 
dictates of the appellate court under which it 
sits, so Judge Rakoff has to follow the 
precedents of the Second Circuit, including 
the Newman decision. But once he was 
designated to sit on the Ninth Circuit, he had 
a freer hand to consider the proper analysis of 
what type of benefit to a tipper was sufficient 
for insider trading liability. 
In the Salman opinion, Judge Rakoff pointed 
out that the Second Circuit’s decision is not 
binding on the Ninth Circuit, but noted that 
“we would not lightly ignore the most recent 
ruling of our sister circuit in an area of law 
that it has frequently encountered.” He wrote 
that if the Newman case meant that every 
benefit provided to a tipper had to be 
tangible, then “we decline to follow it” 
because it would “depart from the clear 
holding of Dirks” that recognized gifts as an 
acceptable benefit. 
Without saying he disagreed with the 
Newman approach, he pointed out that it 
could go too far in protecting tipping in 
certain situations. “A corporate insider or 
other person in possession of confidential and 
proprietary information would be free to 
disclose that information to her relatives, and 
they would be free to trade on it, provided 
only that she asked for no tangible 
compensation in return,” he wrote. 
In finding that passing along information 
among close family members was sufficient 
even without proof of a tangible benefit, 
Judge Rakoff emphasized what a narrower 
reading of the law might entail. 
Judge Rakoff’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit 
did not directly reject the Newman decision, 
which would have set up the type of 
disagreement among the appeals courts that 
the Supreme Court might step in to resolve. 
Instead, the decision views tipping 
information among family members as very 
different from the Newman case, in which the 
participants in the trading were casual social 
acquaintances with little continuing 
connection among them. Thus, in Judge 
Rakoff’s view, close family members like 
those in the Salman case do not need anything 
more than love and affection to establish that 
there was a benefit received for insider 
information. 
The Newman and Salman cases set very 
different limits for the benefit element of 
tipping. If the defendants are just friends, and 
perhaps not very good ones, then the benefit 
to the tipper must have a tangible value. 
When information passes between close 
family members, then the benefit is 
essentially presumed, and additional 
evidence beyond their relationship is 
unnecessary. 
As more tipping cases work through the 
system, the courts will have to figure out how 
they fit under the decisions of both the 
Second and Ninth Circuits. cases involving 
more distant relatives, or those who do not 
interact on a regular basis, may be murkier. 
Still, an especially close friendship might be 
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enough to establish that giving the 
information was a gift sufficient to show the 
benefit. 
For prosecutors and the S.E.C., the Salman 
opinion gives them something to point to on 
what constitutes the requisite benefit in 
exchange for insider information that avoids 
the tougher test in the Newman decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Newman and Salman decisions are not 
taking opposite positions, but are not 
harmonious, either. Judge Rakoff’s opinion 
limits the effect of the Second Circuit’s 
decision on insider trading law by simply 
ignoring its benefit analysis for family 
members passing along inside information. It 
will be interesting to see whether other courts 
follow Judge Rakoff’s reasoning about the 
Newman decision.
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Visa, Inc. v. Stoumbos & Visa, Inc. v. Osborn 
15-962 & 15-961 
Ruling Below: Osborn v. Visa Inc., 797 F.3d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
A group brought action against a collective of banks and bankcard association, claiming that said 
collective was in violation of the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive activities. The 
motion was dismissed, and the motion to amend the complaint was denied. The plaintiffs 
appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, that they had sufficiently 
alleged their claim of horizontal conspiracy, and that member banks failed to establish 
withdrawal from conspiracy. 
Question Presented: Whether allegations that members of a business association agreed to 
adhere to the association's rules and possess governance rights in the association, without more, 
are sufficient to plead the element of conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1, as the Court of Appeals held below, or are insufficient, as the Third, Fourth, and 
Ninth Circuits have held. 
 
Sam OSBORN, et al., Appellants 
v. 
VISA INC., et al., Appellees. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on August 4, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS. 
 
WILKINS, Circuit Judge: 
 
Users and operators of independent (non-
bank) automated teller machines (ATMs) 
brought these related actions against Visa, 
MasterCard, and certain affiliated banks, 
alleging anticompetitive schemes for pricing 
ATM access fees. The crux of the Plaintiffs' 
complaints is that when someone uses a non-
bank ATM, the cardholder pays a greater fee 
and the ATM operator earns a lower return on 
each transaction because of certain Visa and 
MasterCard network rules. These rules 
prohibit differential pricing based on the cost 
of the network that links the ATM to the 
cardholder's bank. In other words, the 
Plaintiffs allege anticompetitive harm 
because Visa and MasterCard prevent an 
independent operator from charging less, and 
potentially earning more, when an ATM 
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transaction is processed through a network 
unaffiliated with Visa and MasterCard. 
The District Court concluded that the 
Plaintiffs had failed to allege essential 
components of standing, and also that they 
had failed to allege an agreement in restraint 
of trade cognizable under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. We disagree, and so we 
vacate and remand these cases for further 
proceedings based on the proposed amended 
complaint. 
I. 
 
ATMs “have been a part of the American 
landscape since the 1970s—beacons of self-
service and convenience, they revolutionized 
banking in ways we take for granted today.” 
One view is that “[t]hey live to serve; we only 
really notice them when we can't seem to 
locate one.” But Plaintiffs tell us they do take 
notice of ATMs—specifically, of the fee 
structure that attaches to their use and what 
they gain or lose from it. We credit for 
purposes of this appeal all facts alleged in the 
proposed amended complaints. 
 
Some background history: Until the mid–
1990s, consumers who wished to withdraw 
cash from their bank accounts generally 
could do so only by visiting a bank branch or 
a bank-operated ATM. But states began to 
abolish various laws that had prohibited 
ATM operators from charging access fees 
directly to cardholders. This created a 
financial incentive for nonbanks to enter the 
ATM market, and independent ATMs took 
root accordingly. These independent ATMs 
connect to a cardholder's bank through an 
ATM network. The most popular networks 
are operated by Visa (the Plus, Interlink, and 
VisaNet networks) and MasterCard (the 
Cirrus and Maestro networks).  
 
Today, a cardholder can use any independent 
ATM to access her bank account, so long as 
her bank card and the ATM are linked by at 
least one common network. Most bank cards 
indicate the networks to which they are 
linked with logos printed on the back of the 
card, referred to colloquially as “bugs.” 
 
Independent ATM operators rely on two 
streams of revenue to sustain their 
businesses. The first is the “net interchange” 
fee: the gross interchange fee paid by the 
cardholder's bank to the ATM operator, 
which runs between $0.00 and $0.60 per 
transaction, less any network services fee 
charged by the ATM network. MasterCard 
and Visa generally charge high network 
services fees, which means that ATM 
operators receive low net interchange fees—
running between $0.06 and $0.29 for 
domestic transactions, and even less for 
international transactions—for transactions 
on these networks. Several competing 
networks charge comparatively low network 
services fees, thus enabling an ATM operator 
to collect a higher net interchange fee (up to 
$0.50 per transaction) when using the lower-
fee networks. 
 
The second source of revenue comes from the 
ATM access fees paid by the cardholder. The 
average access fee in 2012 was $2.10.  
 
Visa and MasterCard each impose, as a 
condition for ATM operators to access their 
networks, a sort of nondiscrimination or most 
favored customer clause called the “Access 
Fee Rules.” These rules provide that no ATM 
operator may charge customers whose 
transactions are processed on Visa or 
MasterCard networks a greater access fee 
than that charged to any customer whose 
transaction is processed on an alternative 
ATM network. Thus, under the Access Fee 
Rules, operators cannot say to cardholders: 
“We will charge you $2.00 for a MasterCard 
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or Visa transaction, but if your card has a Star 
or Credit Union 24 bug on it, we will charge 
you only $1.75.” 
 
Both Visa and MasterCard were owned and 
operated as joint ventures by a large group of 
retail banks at the time that the Access Fee 
Rules were adopted. Although these member 
banks later relinquished direct control over 
the bankcard associations through public 
offerings, the IPOs did not alter the substance 
of the Access Fee Rules, which remain intact 
to this day. 
 
Plaintiffs assert that these rules illegally 
restrain the efficient pricing of ATM 
services. They characterize the Access Fee 
Rules as constituting an “anti-steering” 
regime that prevents independent ATM 
operators from incentivizing cardholders to 
choose and use cards “that are more efficient 
and less costly than either Visa or 
MasterCard's.”  
 
This consolidated appeal arises from 
decisions in three separate but related civil 
actions. The first action, Stoumbos v. Visa, 
was filed by a debit cardholder, Mary 
Stoumbos, who paid access fees in 
connection with ATM transactions at various 
independent ATMs. The second action, 
Mackmin v. Visa (referred to here as the 
Osborn case), was filed by four consumers of 
independent and bank-run ATM services. 
The third action, National ATM Council v. 
Visa, was brought by a leading association of 
independent ATM operators and several 
individual ATM operators. The Plaintiffs 
allege violations of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act as well as various state laws, and they 
name Visa and MasterCard entities as 
defendants. In addition, the Osborn plaintiffs 
name certain member banks as co-
defendants. 
 
On February 12, 2013, the District Court 
concluded that the Plaintiffs' respective 
complaints had failed to allege facts 
sufficient to establish standing and, in the 
alternative, lacked adequate facts to establish 
concerted activity under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. It dismissed not just the 
complaints, but the cases without prejudice. 
 
In an attempt to toll the statute of limitations, 
Plaintiffs timely moved the District Court to 
modify its judgment from dismissal of the 
cases without prejudice to dismissal of the 
complaints with leave to replead. Plaintiffs 
simultaneously submitted proposed amended 
complaints. On December 19, 2013, the 
District Court denied Plaintiffs' motions after 
concluding that their proposed amended 
complaints still lacked sufficient facts to 
establish standing or a conspiracy. The 
Plaintiffs appeal. 
 
II. 
 
Procedural quirks notwithstanding, we 
review de novo the District Court's 
determination that the filing of the amended 
complaints would be futile due to the 
perceived deficiencies of those complaints 
under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). To reach 
that bottom line, we must do some procedural 
untangling. 
 
The District Court's February 12 order 
dismissed the cases without prejudice. The 
principle guiding a dismissal without 
prejudice is that absent futility or special 
circumstances (such as undue delay, bad 
faith, or dilatory motive), a plaintiff should 
have the opportunity to replead so that claims 
will be decided on merits rather than 
technicalities. Where, as it appears was the 
case here, a plaintiff has not notified the 
district court that a statute of limitations issue 
might bar the plaintiff “from correcting the 
complaint's defects and filing a new lawsuit,” 
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a dismissal of the case without prejudice is 
not an abuse of discretion. 
 
Plaintiffs followed an appropriate course 
against this background, asking the District 
Court to modify its judgment pursuant to 
Rule 59—so that merely the complaint, and 
not the case, would have been dismissed—
and simultaneously filing a proposed 
amended complaint. In its December 19 
opinion on those motions, the District Court 
asked and answered the essential question—
whether leave to amend was futile—but the 
accompanying order purported to deny on the 
merits Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend 
their complaints, and to deny as moot their 
motion to modify the February 12 judgment. 
As a technical matter, the District Court 
lacked authority to rule on the merits of the 
Rule 15(a) motion because it did not modify 
its final judgment dismissing those cases.  
 
Because the District Court's denial of the 
Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion as moot was 
based on its conclusion that amendment of 
the complaints would be futile, see NAC II, 7 
F.Supp.3d at 54, we review the decision 
below as a denial on the merits of the motion 
to modify the judgment. On this question, we 
look for abuse of discretion. An abuse of 
discretion necessarily occurs when a district 
court misapprehends the underlying 
substantive law, and we examine the 
underlying substantive law de novo. In other 
words, the District Court's futility conclusion 
turned on a legal determination—here, the 
sufficiency of the proposed amended 
complaints under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 
12(b)(6)—and we review those legal 
determinations independently of the District 
Court. 
 
That brings us to the substantive questions we 
must decide. We look first, as always, at the 
question of whether the Plaintiffs have 
standing and second, whether the Plaintiffs' 
proposed amended complaints adequately 
stated a claim. 
 
A. 
 
The District Court determined that the 
Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because 
their allegations showed neither injury nor 
redressability. To establish standing, a 
plaintiff must show that (i) it has “suffered a 
concrete and particularized injury in fact, (ii) 
that was caused by or is fairly traceable to the 
actions of the defendant, and (iii) is capable 
of resolution and likely to be redressed by 
judicial decision.”  
 
Plaintiffs contend that “in the absence of the 
access fee rules, ATM operators would offer 
consumers differentiated access fees at the 
point of transaction, consumers would then 
demand multi-bug PIN cards from their 
banks, their banks would provide these cards, 
and the market for network services would 
become more competitive, all resulting in 
more choice of networks and lower access 
fees for consumers.” The District Court held 
that this was an “attenuated, speculative 
chain of events[ ] that relies on numerous 
independent actors, including the PIN card 
issuing banks.” We disagree, and we think 
the District Court was demanding proof of an 
economic theory that was not required in a 
complaint. 
 
A plaintiff's burden to demonstrate standing 
grows heavier at each stage of the litigation. 
Thus, “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual 
allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a 
motion to dismiss we presum [e] that general 
allegations embrace those specific facts that 
are necessary to support the claim.”  
 
Two distinct theories of injury are relevant in 
this appeal. First is the ATM operators' 
theory of harm. The operators allege that 
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MasterCard and Visa, working in concert 
with the member banks, have maximized 
their own returns on each transaction, thereby 
minimizing the independent ATM operators' 
cut. According to the operators, in a 
competitive market, the imbalance between 
low- and high-cost networks “would be 
corrected by a price differential for the final 
service, and consumers would respond to 
lower prices for a fungible service by 
switching.” But while ATM operators can 
respond by routing transactions on multi-
bugged cards over the lowest priced 
networks, they are prevented from using 
differential pricing to incentivize customers 
to use such cards. As the operator plaintiffs 
put it, “ATM operators are prohibited from 
setting the price differential needed to 
encourage consumers to switch.” Visa and 
MasterCard are thereby insulated from 
competition with other networks and can 
charge supra-competitive network services 
fees with impunity. 
 
The consumers' theory of harm complements 
that of the operators. The consumers allege 
that they pay inflated access fees when they 
visit ATMs. They believe that the Access Fee 
Rules inhibit competition in both the network 
services market and the market for ATM 
access fees. But for the Rules, some ATM 
operators would offer discounted access fees 
for cards linked to lower-cost ATM 
networks, and this discounting would create 
downward pressure on access fees generally. 
 
Economic harm, such as that alleged here, “is 
a classic form of injury-in-fact.” But the 
Defendants painted Plaintiffs' allegations as 
speculative and conclusory, and the District 
Court agreed. The District Court reasoned 
that the “protracted chain of causation” 
alleged by Plaintiffs “fails both because of 
the uncertainty of several individual links and 
because of the number of speculative links 
that must hold for the chain to connect the 
challenged acts to the asserted particularized 
injury.” This was error. 
 
At the pleadings stage, a court “must accept 
as true all material allegations of the 
complaint,” an obligation that we have 
recognized “might appear to be in tension 
with the Court's further admonition that an 
allegation of injury or of redressability that is 
too speculative will not suffice to invoke the 
federal judicial power.” But “this ostensible 
tension is reconciled by distinguishing 
allegations of facts, either historical or 
otherwise demonstrable, from allegations 
that are really predictions.” Thus, “[w]hen 
considering any chain of allegations for 
standing purposes, we may reject as overly 
speculative ... those types of allegations that 
are not normally susceptible of labelling as 
‘true’ or ‘false.’ ” 
 
Plaintiffs' theories here are susceptible to 
proof at trial. The Plaintiffs allege a system in 
which Visa and MasterCard insulate their 
networks from price competition from other 
networks. This insulation yields higher 
profits for Visa and MasterCard (and higher 
returns for their shareholders), at the cost of 
consumers and independent ATM operators. 
The economic injury alleged is present and 
ongoing. 
 
Moreover, the complaints contain factual 
details, including details about the Plaintiffs' 
own conduct, that support the alleged causal 
link between the Access Fee Rules and the 
economic harm. According to the Plaintiffs, 
Visa and MasterCard currently capture over 
half of all ATM transactions, despite 
charging higher fees than rival networks. 
Plaintiffs further allege that independent 
ATM operators (such as the operator 
plaintiffs) have the desire and technical 
capacity to offer discounts on cards linked to 
low-cost networks. They contend that 
consumers, such as Stoumbos and the Osborn 
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plaintiffs, are “sensitive to differences in 
ATM Access Fees and where possible will 
seek out ATMs with the lowest Access Fees.” 
To be certain, Plaintiffs also rely on certain 
economic assumptions about supply and 
demand: that other consumers besides the 
Plaintiffs are price conscious; that bank 
operators will respond to consumer demand 
for cards tied to low-cost networks; and that 
in the face of competitive pressure, ATM 
networks will reduce their network fees. But 
these sorts of assumptions are provable at 
trial. Indeed, allegations of economic harm 
“based on standard principles of ‘supply and 
demand’ ” are “routinely credited by courts 
in a variety of contexts.” 
 
In deciding that the Plaintiffs had failed to 
establish injury and redressability, the 
District Court relied on cases that had been 
decided at summary judgment. On a motion 
for summary judgment by a defendant, the 
question is not whether the plaintiff has 
asserted a plausible theory of harm, but rather 
whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude 
that its theory is correct. A Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion, however, is not the occasion for 
evaluating the empirical accuracy of an 
economic theory. Because the economic facts 
alleged by the Plaintiffs are specific, 
plausible, and susceptible to proof at trial, 
they pass muster for standing purposes at the 
pleadings stage. 
 
B. 
 
We next turn to the District Court's 
alternative holding that the Plaintiffs failed to 
plead adequate facts to establish the existence 
of concerted activity. Under the familiar 
Twombly–Iqbal standard, “[t]o survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.' ” 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any 
“contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce.” Thus, to 
make out a claim under this section, the 
Plaintiffs must allege that “the challenged 
anticompetitive conduct stems from ... an 
agreement, tacit or express.” If such an 
agreement is among competitors, we refer to 
it as a horizontal restraint. The complaints are 
sufficient if they contain “enough factual 
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an 
agreement was made.” We conclude that the 
Plaintiffs have alleged a horizontal 
agreement to restrain trade that suffices at the 
pleadings stage. 
 
According to the Plaintiffs, the member 
banks developed and adopted the Access Fee 
Rules when the banks controlled Visa and 
MasterCard. The rules served several 
purposes. First and foremost, the rules 
protected Visa and MasterCard from 
competition with lower-cost ATM networks, 
thereby permitting Visa and MasterCard to 
charge supra-competitive fees. The rules also 
benefited the banks, who were equity 
shareholders of the associations (and 
therefore financial beneficiaries of the deal). 
And the rules protected banks from 
competition with each other over the types of 
bugs offered on bank cards.  
 
That the rules were adopted by Visa and 
MasterCard as single entities does not 
preclude a finding of concerted action. The 
Supreme Court has “long held that concerted 
action under [Section] 1 does not turn simply 
on whether the parties involved are legally 
distinct entities,” but rather depends upon “a 
functional consideration of how the parties 
involved in the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct actually operate.” Thus, “a legally 
single entity violate[s] [Section] 1 when the 
entity [i]s controlled by a group of 
competitors and serve[s], in essence, as a 
vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.” 
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The allegations here—that a group of retail 
banks fixed an element of access fee pricing 
through bankcard association rules—
describe the sort of concerted action 
necessary to make out a Section 1 claim. 
Indeed, in 2003 the Second Circuit upheld a 
trial court's finding that rules adopted by Visa 
and MasterCard that prohibited member 
banks from issuing American Express or 
Discover cards violated Section 1 of the Act.  
 
The Defendants correctly observe that 
“[m]ere membership in associations is not 
enough to establish participation in a 
conspiracy with other members of those 
associations.” But the Plaintiffs here have 
done much more than allege “mere 
membership.” They have alleged that the 
member banks used the bankcard 
associations to adopt and enforce a 
supracompetitive pricing regime for ATM 
access fees. That is enough to satisfy the 
plausibility standard. 
 
Defendants next seek refuge in the fact that 
the banks reorganized MasterCard and Visa 
as publicly held corporations in 2006 and 
2008, respectively. The Defendants contend 
that even if there had been agreements or 
conspiracies, the public offerings terminated 
them. In their view, the offering constituted a 
withdrawal by the member banks—and with 
that withdrawal, the cessation of any 
concerted action. The Rules that remained 
intact no longer represented an agreement by 
the member banks, but rather unilateral 
impositions by the bankcard associations 
themselves, over which the banks no longer 
had control. 
 
To establish withdrawal, a defendant may 
show that it has taken “[a]ffirmative acts 
inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy 
and communicated in a manner reasonably 
calculated to reach co-conspirators.” Even 
where a member of the conspiracy appears to 
sever ties with other co-conspirators, there is 
no withdrawal if that member continues to 
support or benefit from the agreement. 
Whether there was an effective withdrawal is 
typically a question of fact for the jury.  
 
According to the complaints, each member 
bank “knew and understood that it and each 
and every other member of the applicable 
network would agree or continue to agree to 
be bound” by the rules both before and after 
the public offerings. To support that 
allegation, the plaintiffs point out that the 
banks have continued to issue Visa- and 
MasterCard-branded cards and to comply 
with the Access Fee Rules at their own 
ATMs. Furthermore, even though the banks 
no longer directly control Visa and 
MasterCard, the plaintiffs observe, the banks 
work with those associations to route more 
transactions over their networks. For 
example, at least some member banks offer 
single-bug cards so that independent ATM 
operators have no choice but to run those 
transactions over a high-cost network run by 
Visa or MasterCard. Based on these 
allegations, a jury could no doubt conclude 
that, in so doing, the banks continue to protect 
Visa and MasterCard from price competition. 
Plaintiffs also allege that several member 
banks continue to benefit indirectly from the 
Access Fee Rules. Because the major banks 
still own shares in Visa and MasterCard, it 
can be inferred that the banks reap some 
ongoing financial benefit from increased 
profits at Visa and MasterCard. And by 
removing any incentive for customers to 
demand multi-bugged debit cards, the banks 
are able to avoid competition with each other 
on network offerings attached to their cards. 
 
We therefore reject the Defendants' assertion 
that the public offerings dispelled any hint of 
conspiracy. The Plaintiffs have adequately 
alleged an agreement that originated when 
the member banks owned and operated Visa 
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and MasterCard and which continued even 
after the public offerings of those 
associations. 
 
In a final attempt to defeat the proposed 
complaints, the Defendants contend that even 
if the Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded 
standing and agreement, they have failed to 
state a claim because their allegations do not 
establish antitrust injury. The Defendants do 
not provide a meaningful argument as to why 
antitrust standing is not present here, where 
the Plaintiffs have alleged that the Access Fee 
Rules chill competition among network 
service providers, leading to artificially high 
access fees for consumers and artificially low 
margins for the ATM operators. We therefore 
decline Defendants' invitation to affirm on 
that basis. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 
District Court erred in concluding that the 
Plaintiffs had failed to plead adequate facts to 
establish standing or the existence of a 
horizontal conspiracy to restrain trade. We 
therefore vacate the District Court's 
December 19 order denying the Plaintiffs' 
motion to amend the judgment, and we 
remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
SO ORDERED. 
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“Supreme Court agrees to review ATM fee antitrust lawsuit” 
 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
June 28, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed 
to hear appeals by Visa Inc, Mastercard Inc 
and several U.S. banks seeking to throw out 
lawsuits claiming they conspired to inflate 
the prices of ATM access fees in violation of 
antitrust law. 
The high court will hear the companies' bid 
to overturn an August 2015 ruling by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit that revived three related class action 
lawsuits. 
The appeals court said a district court erred 
when it concluded that consumers had no 
standing to sue and had not adequately 
alleged antitrust violations. It remanded the 
three consolidated lawsuits to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
The decision revived two class action suits 
brought by consumers and another one 
brought by independent ATM operators. 
Their lawsuits accused Visa and MasterCard 
of adopting rules protecting themselves from 
competition with a lower-cost ATM network. 
The rules blocked ATM operators from 
charging less when ATM transactions were 
processed by networks competing with Visa 
and Mastercard, the lawsuits said. 
The rules also benefited major banks, which 
were equity shareholders of Visa and 
Mastercard, the lawsuits said. 
The lawsuits seek damages for consumers 
and ATM operators for violations of antitrust 
law. 
The lawsuits said that the banks controlled 
Visa and MasterCard and set higher ATM 
charges before the credit card companies 
went public in 2008 and 2006, respectively. 
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments 
and issue a ruling in its next term, which 
starts in October and ends in June 2017. 
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“Supreme Court Will Hear Antitrust Case Over ATM Fees” 
 
The National Law Journal 
Zoe Tillman 
June 28, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed 
to hear an antitrust case that accuses Visa 
Inc., MasterCard Inc. and three major 
banks—Bank of America, Chase and Wells 
Fargo—of conspiring to inflate ATM access 
fees. 
Operators and users of independent ATM 
machines claim Visa and MasterCard, which 
run ATM networks, and the banks illegally 
control how much the ATM operators charge 
consumers for access. The plaintiffs say that 
the defendants conspired to adopt and 
enforce rules that prevent operators from 
charging consumers lower fees for getting 
cash via competitor ATM networks. 
The case was dismissed in 2013 but was 
revived last year by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit. The appeals court found 
that the plaintiffs met the standard for 
pleading antitrust claims over the banks' and 
networks' roles in setting ATM fee rules. 
The banks and networks argued in their 
petition to the Supreme Court in January that 
the D.C. Circuit's decision would make 
participation in a business membership 
association — in this case, the bankcard 
associations that banks joined to be part of 
Visa and MasterCard's ATM networks — a 
violation of federal antitrust law. 
"If firms that participate in business 
associations must incur the burden of 
defending costly antitrust litigation and 
discovery on mere allegations like these, the 
antitrust laws will become a substantial 
deterrent to the use of this procompetitive 
form of business organization," the financial 
institutions wrote. 
The case concerns independent ATM 
machines that aren't affiliated with a 
particular bank. Visa and MasterCard operate 
the most popular networks that connect 
independent ATMs to cardholders' bank 
accounts so that they can withdraw cash. At 
issue is how much the operators charge 
consumers to get cash via Visa and 
MasterCard networks, as compared to rival 
networks. 
The ATM operators and users claimed that 
Visa, MasterCard and the banks conspired to 
keep their fees high by barring operators from 
charging lower service fees for consumers' 
access to less expensive networks. The 
operators said those rules deprived them of 
the opportunity to attract consumers who use 
the cheaper rival networks. 
Three lawsuits filed by operators and users 
were consolidated before U.S. District Judge 
Amy Berman Jackson of the District of 
Columbia. She dismissed the cases in 2013, 
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finding that the claims of economic injury 
were too speculative and that the plaintiffs 
failed to show how membership in the 
bankcard associations amounted to collusion 
under federal antitrust law. 
The D.C. Circuit reversed Jackson in August. 
Judge Robert Wilkins, writing for a three-
judge panel, said that Jackson demanded a 
"proof of economic theory" that wasn't 
required at that stage of the litigation. On the 
antitrust claims, Wilkins wrote that the 
plaintiffs did more than just allege that the 
banks were part of a membership association. 
"They have alleged that the member banks 
used the bankcard associations to adopt and 
enforce a supracompetitive pricing regime 
for ATM access fees," Wilkins wrote. "That 
is enough to satisfy the plausibility standard." 
The membership associations no longer exist, 
since Visa and MasterCard went public in 
2006 and 2008, respectively, and were no 
longer owned by a group of banks. But the 
plaintiffs claim the banks continued to hold 
interests in Visa and MasterCard and that the 
ATM fee rules did not change after the public 
offering. 
The banks and networks said in their cert 
petition that the D.C. Circuit's decision 
conflicted with a 2008 ruling by the Ninth 
Circuit that rejected an antitrust class action 
against Visa, MasterCard and banks over 
merchant discount and credit card 
interchange fees. The Ninth Circuit held in 
Kendall v. Visa that membership in an 
association and adopting the rules of a 
particular consortium wasn't enough to make 
out antitrust claims. 
The operators and users said their case was 
different because, as Wilkins wrote, they 
alleged more than just membership as the 
basis for the conspiracy. 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
partner Boris Bershteyn, a lead counsel for 
the banks and networks, declined to 
comment. Skadden represents Chase; Arnold 
& Porter represents Visa; Morrison & 
Foerster represents Bank of America; 
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler represents 
Wells Fargo; and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton & Garrison represents MasterCard. 
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro managing 
partner Steve Berman, a lead attorney for the 
plaintiffs, said in an email that he was 
surprised the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case but was "confident we will win." 
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan also 
represents the operators and users.
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“Judge Reinstates ATM Antitrust Case Against Visa, MasterCard” 
 
The Wall Street Journal 
Angela Chen 
August 4, 2015 
 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals on Tuesday reinstated an antitrust 
lawsuit brought against Visa Inc. and  
MasterCard Inc.  by a trade association of 
ATM operators. 
Representatives for the two payment-card 
networks weren’t immediately available for 
comment.  
Consumers, independent ATM operators and 
the National ATM Council filed the lawsuit 
in 2011. They alleged Visa’s and 
MasterCard’s ATM-fee policies suppressed 
competition because they barred ATM 
operators from offering discounts to 
customers who complete transactions over 
less-costly payment networks. 
In 2013, a fedral judge in a 39-page ruling, 
found several problems with the lawsuits and 
dismissed them.  
 
“The complaints bristle with indignation, but 
when one strips away the conclusory 
assertions and the inferences proffered 
without factual support, there is very little left 
to consider,” wrote Judge Amy Berman 
Jackson at the time. 
In reversing the dismissal, the D.C. appellate 
court ruled that there were grounds for a case 
because Visa and MasterCard “member 
banks used the bank associations to adopt and 
enforce a supracompetitive pricing regime 
for ATM access fees,” which then made the 
networks more expensive for ATM operators 
and consumers to use. 
The lawsuit seeks damages against Visa and 
MasterCard and asks the court to prevent 
Visa and MasterCard from continuing to 
restrict how operators charge ATM access 
fee.
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National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc. 
15-1251 
Ruling Below: SW Gen., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
Question Presented: Whether the precondition in 5 U.S.C. 3345(b)(1) on service in an acting 
capacity by a person nominated by the President to fill the office on a permanent basis, requiring 
that a person who is nominated to fill a vacant office that is subject to the Federal Vacancies 
Reform Act may not perform the office’s functions and duties in an acting capacity unless the 
person served as first assistant to the vacant office for at least 90 days in the year preceding the 
vacancy, applies only to first assistants who take office under subsection (a)(1) of 5 U.S.C. 3345, 
or whether it also limits acting service by officials who assume acting responsibilities under 
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3). 
 
SW GENERAL, INC., doing business as Southwest Ambulance, Petitioner 
v. 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on August 7, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
 
This case involves a labor dispute between an 
ambulance company and its employees. We 
do not reach the merits of that dispute, 
however, because we conclude that Lafe 
Solomon, the former Acting General Counsel 
of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or Board), served in violation of the 
Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 
(FVRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345 et seq. 
Accordingly, the unfair labor practice (ULP) 
complaint issued against the ambulance 
company was unauthorized. We grant the 
petition for review, deny the cross-
application for enforcement and vacate the 
Board's order. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 
A. Vacancy Statutes 
 
The FVRA is a response to what Chief Justice 
John Marshall called “the various crises of 
human affairs”—problems that arise when 
our Constitution confronts the realities of 
practical governance. Specifically, the 
Appointments Clause generally requires 
“Officers of the United States” to be 
nominated by the President “by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Advice 
and consent is “more than a matter of 
etiquette or protocol”; it is a “structural 
safeguard[ ]” intended to “curb Executive 
abuses of the appointment power” and to 
“promote a judicious choice of persons for 
filling the offices of the union.” But 
vacancies can occur unexpectedly (due to 
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death, resignation, illness, etc.) and the 
confirmation process takes time. To keep the 
federal bureaucracy humming, the President 
needs the power to appoint acting officers 
who can serve on a temporary basis without 
first obtaining the Senate's blessing. 
 
Since the “beginning of the nation,” the 
Congress has given the President this power 
through vacancy statutes. The predecessor to 
the FVRA, the Vacancies Act, was first 
enacted in 1868. The Vacancies Act allowed 
the President to fill vacancies with temporary 
acting officers, subject to limitations on 
whom he could appoint and how long the 
appointee could serve.  
 
Presidents, however, have not always 
complied with the Vacancies Act. By 1998, 
an estimated 20% of all officers in positions 
requiring presidential nomination and Senate 
confirmation (PAS positions) were serving in 
a temporary acting capacity, many well 
beyond the time limits prescribed in the 
Vacancies Act. Nor was the Vacancies Act 
particularly amenable to judicial 
enforcement. In Doolin, for example, we did 
not decide whether the acting director of the 
Office of Thrift Supervision lacked statutory 
authority because we determined that any 
error in his appointment was cured. We relied 
on the doctrine of ratification: because the 
director's decision was later approved by a 
properly appointed director, any defect in his 
appointment was immaterial. Our decision in 
Doolin, along with the President's 
appointment of Bill Lann Lee to be Acting 
Attorney General of Civil Rights in 1997, 
prompted congressional action.  
 
In June 1998, Senators Fred Thompson, 
Robert Byrd, Strom Thurmond and others 
introduced the FVRA to strengthen, and 
ultimately replace, the Vacancies Act. The 
statute was framed as a reclamation of the 
Congress's Appointments Clause power. 
After some amendment, the FVRA was 
enacted in October 1998.  
 
The FVRA provides that, in the event of a 
vacancy in a PAS position, the “first 
assistant” automatically takes over in an 
acting capacity. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). The 
President can also choose to appoint a senior 
employee from the same agency or a PAS 
officer from another agency to serve as the 
acting officer. Generally speaking, an acting 
officer can serve no longer than 210 days and 
cannot become the permanent nominee for 
the position. Moreover, in response to 
Doolin, the FVRA renders actions taken by 
persons serving in violation of the Act void 
ab initio.  
 
B. NLRB General Counsel Vacancy 
 
Under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), the General Counsel of the NLRB 
must be appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. He is 
primarily responsible for prosecuting ULP 
cases before the Board. Indeed, the Board 
cannot adjudicate a ULP dispute until the 
General Counsel decides a charge has merit 
and issues a formal complaint. To manage the 
volume of ULP charges filed each year, the 
General Counsel has delegated his authority 
to investigate charges and issue complaints to 
thirty-two regional directors. The General 
Counsel, however, retains “final authority” 
over charges and complaints and exercises 
“general supervision” of the regional 
directors. 
 
In June 2010, Ronald Meisburg resigned as 
NLRB General Counsel. The President 
directed Lafe Solomon, then—Director of the 
NLRB's Office of Representation Appeals, to 
serve as the Acting General Counsel in 
Meisburg's stead. The President cited the 
FVRA as the authority for Solomon's 
appointment. On January 5, 2011—six 
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months into Solomon's temporary 
appointment—the President nominated him 
to be General Counsel. The Senate, however, 
returned Solomon's nomination. The 
President resubmitted Solomon's nomination 
on May 24, 2013, but ultimately withdrew it 
and nominated Richard Griffin instead, who 
was confirmed by the Senate on October 29, 
2013. All told, Solomon served as Acting 
General Counsel from June 21, 2010 to 
November 4, 2013. 
 
C. Board Proceedings Against Southwest 
 
SW General, Inc. (Southwest) provides 
ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. 
Its emergency medical technicians, nurses 
and paramedics are represented by the 
International Association of Fire Fighters 
Local I–60, AFL–CIO (Union). The most 
recent collective bargaining agreement 
between Southwest and the Union contained 
a “Longevity Pay” provision, guaranteeing 
annual bonuses to Southwest employees who 
had been with the company for at least ten 
years. In December 2012—after the 
collective bargaining agreement expired but 
before the parties negotiated a replacement—
Southwest stopped paying the longevity 
bonuses. 
 
The Union immediately filed a ULP charge 
with the NLRB. Regional Director Cornele 
Overstreet issued a formal complaint on 
January 31, 2013, alleging that Southwest 
had unilaterally discontinued longevity 
payments in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 
8(a)(5) of the NLRA. After a hearing, an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed that 
Southwest had committed a ULP. Southwest 
filed fifteen exceptions to the ALJ's decision, 
the second of which challenged the ULP 
complaint on the ground that Acting General 
Counsel Solomon was serving in violation of 
the FVRA. In May 2014, the NLRB adopted 
the ALJ's recommended order with only 
minor modifications and it did not address 
Southwest's FVRA challenge. 
 
Southwest petitioned this Court for review 
and the Board cross-petitioned for 
enforcement. We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f), (e). 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Southwest maintains that, as of January 2011, 
Acting General Counsel Solomon was 
serving in violation of the FVRA and, thus, 
the ULP complaint issued against it in 
January 2013 was invalid. Specifically, 
Southwest argues that Solomon became 
ineligible to serve as Acting General Counsel 
once the President nominated him to be 
General Counsel. In its original brief, the 
Board vigorously contested Southwest's 
reading of the statute but made no 
argument—except in a lone footnote—about 
the consequences of an FVRA violation. We 
therefore asked the parties to submit 
supplemental briefs addressing whether an 
FVRA violation, assuming one occurred, 
would nonetheless be harmless error. With 
the benefit of the parties' arguments, we now 
conclude that (A) Solomon was serving in 
violation of the FVRA when the complaint 
issued against Southwest and (B) the 
violation requires us to vacate the Board's 
order. 
 
A. 
 
The key provision of the FVRA, for present 
purposes, is section 3345. For ease of 
reference, we quote the provision in full: 
 
§ 3345. Acting officer 
(a) If an officer of an Executive 
agency (including the Executive 
Office of the President, and other than 
the Government Accountability 
Office) whose appointment to office 
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is required to be made by the 
President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or 
is otherwise unable to perform the 
functions and duties of the office— 
(1) the first assistant to the office of 
such officer shall perform the 
functions and duties of the office 
temporarily in an acting capacity 
subject to the time limitations of 
section 3346; 
(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the 
President (and only the President) 
may direct a person who serves in an 
office for which appointment is 
required to be made by the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, to perform the functions 
and duties of the vacant office 
temporarily in an acting capacity 
subject to the time limitations of 
section 3346; or 
(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the 
President (and only the President) 
may direct an officer or employee of 
such Executive agency to perform the 
functions and duties of the vacant 
office temporarily in an acting 
capacity, subject to the time 
limitations of section 3346, if— 
(A) during the 365–day period 
preceding the date of death, 
resignation, or beginning of inability 
to serve of the applicable officer, the 
officer or employee served in a 
position in such agency for not less 
than 90 days; and 
(B) the rate of pay for the position 
described under subparagraph (A) is 
equal to or greater than the minimum 
rate of pay payable for a position at 
GS–15 of the General Schedule. 
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection 
(a)(1), a person may not serve as an 
acting officer for an office under this 
section, if— 
(A) during the 365–day period 
preceding the date of the death, 
resignation, or beginning of inability 
to serve, such person— 
(i) did not serve in the position of first 
assistant to the office of such officer; 
or 
(ii) served in the position of first 
assistant to the office of such officer 
for less than 90 days; and 
(B) the President submits a 
nomination of such person to the 
Senate for appointment to such office. 
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to 
any person if— 
(A) such person is serving as the first 
assistant to the office of an officer 
described under subsection (a); 
(B) the office of such first assistant is 
an office for which appointment is 
required to be made by the President, 
by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate; and 
(C) the Senate has approved the 
appointment of such person to such 
office. 
(c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection 
(a)(1), the President (and only the 
President) may direct an officer who 
is nominated by the President for 
reappointment for an additional term 
to the same office in an Executive 
department without a break in 
service, to continue to serve in that 
office subject to the time limitations 
in section 3346, until such time as the 
Senate has acted to confirm or reject 
the nomination, notwithstanding 
adjournment sine die. 
(2) For purposes of this section and 
sections 3346, 3347, 3348, 3349, 
3349a, and 3349d, the expiration of a 
term of office is an inability to 
perform the functions and duties of 
such office. 
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Solomon became Acting General Counsel 
pursuant to subsection (a)(3)—the senior 
agency employee provision. As the Director 
of the Office of Representation Appeals for 
the previous ten years, Solomon easily met 
the salary and experience requirements of 
that subsection. According to Southwest,  
however, Solomon could no longer serve as 
Acting General Counsel once the President 
nominated him in January 2011 to be General 
Counsel. Subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA 
prohibits a person from being both the acting 
officer and the permanent nominee unless (1) 
he served as the first assistant to the office in 
question for at least 90 of the last 365 days or 
(2) he was confirmed by the Senate to be the 
first assistant. Solomon was never a first 
assistant at all so the exceptions plainly do 
not apply to him. The Board, however, 
contends that the prohibition in subsection 
(b)(1) governs only an acting officer who 
assumes the position pursuant to subsection 
(a)(1), not an acting officer who is directed to 
serve by the President pursuant to 
subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3). Thus, the pivotal 
question is whether the prohibition in 
subsection (b)(1) applies to all acting 
officers, as Southwest contends, or just first 
assistants who become acting officers by 
virtue of subsection (a)(1), as the Board 
contends. Considering this question de novo, 
we think Southwest has the better argument. 
 
The first independent clause of subsection 
(b)(1) is the clearest indication of its overall 
scope. That clause states that “a person may 
not serve as an acting officer for an office 
under this section.” The term “a person” is 
broad; it covers the full spectrum of possible 
candidates for acting officer. And the phrase 
“this section” plainly refers to section 3345 in 
its entirety. Throughout the FVRA, the 
Congress was precise in its use of internal 
cross-references. If the Congress had wanted 
to enact the Board's understanding, it would 
have said “first assistant” and “that 
subsection” instead of “a person” and “this 
section.” Thus, the plain language of 
subsection (b)(1) manifests that no person 
can serve as both the acting officer and the 
permanent nominee (unless one of the 
exceptions in subsections (b)(1)(A) or (b)(2) 
applies). 
 
The Board's main argument to the contrary 
focuses on the first dependent clause in 
subsection (b)(1): “Notwithstanding 
subsection (a)(1).” According to the Board, 
the “notwithstanding” clause limits 
subsection (b)(1)'s prohibition to first 
assistants who become acting officers 
pursuant to subsection (a)(1). There are 
several flaws with this argument. For starters, 
it is not what the word “notwithstanding” 
means. “Notwithstanding” means “in spite 
of,” not, as the Board would have it, “for 
purposes of” or “with respect to.” Here, then, 
the “notwithstanding” clause means “to the 
extent that subsection (a)(1) deviates from 
subsection (b)(1), subsection (b)(1) 
controls.” The Congress likely referenced 
subsection (a)(1) to clarify that its 
command—that the first assistant “shall” 
take over as acting officer—does not 
supersede the prohibition in subsection 
(b)(1). But, apart from setting out an order of 
operations, the “notwithstanding” clause has 
no significance for the ultimate scope of 
subsection (b)(1).  
 
Context further refutes the Board's 
“notwithstanding” argument. As discussed, 
the Board's interpretation of 
“notwithstanding” is irreconcilable with the 
breadth of the words “a person” and “this 
section” in the remainder of the introductory 
clause. Indeed, the only other time section 
3345 uses the phrase “a person” is in 
subsection (a)(2) and, there, the phrase is 
plainly not limited to a first assistant. 
Moreover, the Congress used the word 
“notwithstanding” several times in section 
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3345. Each time, it plainly meant “in spite of” 
rather than “with respect to.” “It is a well 
established rule of statutory construction that 
a word is presumed to have the same meaning 
in all subsections of the same statute.” 
Similarly, the Congress used the phrase “For 
purposes of” in subsection (c)(2), which 
shows that it knew how to use limiting 
language when it wanted to. The Board's 
crabbed interpretation of “notwithstanding” 
simply does not pass muster. 
 
Further, the Board's reading of subsection 
(b)(1)—but not Southwest's—renders other 
provisions of section 3345 superfluous. In the 
Board's view, subsection (b)(1) applies only 
to subsection (a)(1)—the first assistant 
provision. Although we do not decide its 
meaning today, subsection (a)(1) may refer to 
the person who is serving as first assistant 
when the vacancy occurs. Under this reading, 
subsection (a)(1) provides a default rule that 
automatically promotes someone (the current 
first assistant) to be the acting officer without 
a break in service and without action by the 
President. But if subsection (a)(1) refers to 
the first assistant at the time of the vacancy, 
then the condition in subsection 
(b)(1)(A)(i)—that the person “did not serve 
in the position of first assistant to the office” 
in the prior 365 days—is inoperative because 
the current first assistant necessarily served 
as the first assistant in the previous year. If 
Southwest is correct that subsection (b)(1) 
applies to all acting officers, however, then 
subsection (b)(1)(A)(i) is not superfluous 
because many PAS officers (subsection 
(a)(2)) and senior agency employees 
(subsection (a)(3)) will not have served as the 
first assistant in the prior year. 
 
At oral argument, the Board argued—
consistent with a revised OLC opinion—that 
subsection (a)(1) also applies to a person who 
becomes first assistant after the vacancy 
occurs. This interpretation, the Board 
contends, gives a nonsuperfluous meaning to 
subsection (b)(1)(A)(i). Yet, the Board's 
interpretation faces another surplusage 
problem. Section 3345(b)(2)(A) allows an 
acting officer to also be the permanent 
nominee if, inter alia, he “is serving as [a] 
first assistant.” But the current first 
assistant—whether he became first assistant 
before or after the vacancy—is necessarily 
serving as a first assistant. The Board's 
interpretation (which reads “person” in 
subsection (b) to mean “first assistant”) 
creates surplusage whereas Southwest's 
interpretation (which reads “person” to mean 
“first assistant, PAS officer or senior agency 
employee”) does not. 
 
Perhaps sensing the weakness of its textual 
arguments, the Board falls back on legislative 
history and statutory purpose to support its 
interpretation. Its argument needs to be quite 
strong because, to repeat, the text of the 
FVRA plainly supports Southwest. As we 
shall see, however, the Board's argument is 
anything but. 
 
The Board first points to a floor statement by 
Senator Thompson, the chief sponsor of the 
FVRA. Thompson presaged the Board's 
view, stating, “Under § 3345(b)(1), the 
revised reference to § 3345(a)(1) means that 
this subsection applies only when the acting 
officer is the first assistant, and not when the 
acting officer is designated by the President 
pursuant to §§ 3345(a)(2) or 3345(a)(3).” 
Yet, a statement of a single Senator—even 
the bill's sponsor—is only weak evidence of 
congressional intent. Moreover, Thompson 
was immediately contradicted by Senator 
Byrd—an “original sponsor” of the FVRA. 
Byrd's statement6 hewed much more closely 
to the statutory text and suggested that 
subsection (b)(1) applies to all categories of 
acting officers. Thus, the floor statements are 
a wash. And Senator Thompson's statement 
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is certainly not enough to overcome the 
FVRA's clear text.  
 
The Board next cites a Senate committee 
report to buttress its interpretation. The report 
states that “a first assistant who has not 
received Senate confirmation, but who is 
nominated to fill the office permanently, can 
be made the acting officer only if he has been 
the first assistant for at least 180 days in the 
year preceding the vacancy.” The committee 
report, however, is inapposite because it 
discusses a different version of the FVRA 
from the one ultimately enacted. Specifically, 
an earlier draft of subsection (b) provided: 
 
(b) Notwithstanding section 3346(a)(2), a 
person may not serve as an acting officer for 
an office under this section, if— 
 
(1) on the date of the death, resignation, 
or beginning of inability to server of 
the applicable officer, such person 
serves in the position of first assistant 
to such officer; 
 
(2) during the 365–day period preceding 
such date, such person served in the 
position of first assistant to such 
officer for less than 180 days; and 
 
(3) the President submits a nomination of 
such person to the Senate for 
appointment to such office. 
 
This version of subsection (b) manifestly 
applies to first assistants only. But the version 
ultimately enacted looks quite different. In 
fact, the change in phraseology weighs 
somewhat against the Board's interpretation.  
Finally, the Board contends that Southwest's 
interpretation of subsection (b)(1) defeats the 
purpose behind subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3): 
namely, “expanding the pool of potential 
acting officers beyond first assistants.” But 
accepting Southwest's interpretation in no 
way decreases the pool of people eligible to 
be an acting officer; it merely decreases the 
pool of people eligible to be both the acting 
officer and the permanent nominee. 
 
In short, the text of subsection (b)(1) squarely 
supports Southwest's interpretation and 
neither the legislative history nor the 
purported goal of the FVRA helps the Board. 
We therefore hold that the prohibition in 
subsection (b)(1) applies to all acting 
officers, no matter whether they serve 
pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3). 
Because Solomon was never a first assistant 
and the President nominated him to be 
General Counsel on January 5, 2011, the 
FVRA prohibited him from serving as Acting 
General Counsel from that date forward. 
 
B. 
 
Having concluded that Solomon was serving 
in violation of the FVRA when the ULP 
complaint issued against Southwest, we must 
now determine the consequence of that 
violation. Southwest believes we must vacate 
the Board's order. If the violation had 
occurred in the typical federal office, we 
might agree. The FVRA renders any action 
taken in violation of the statute void ab initio: 
section 3348(d) declares that “[a]n action 
taken by any person who is not acting [in 
compliance with the FVRA] shall have no 
force or effect” and “may not be ratified.” 
Moreover, without a valid complaint, the 
Board could not find Southwest liable for a 
ULP.  
 
But this is not the typical case. Section 
3348(e)(1) exempts “the General Counsel of 
the National Labor Relations Board” from 
the provisions of “section [3348],” including 
the void-ab-initio and no-ratification rules.  
The Board contends that  section 3348(e)(1) 
allows it to raise arguments like harmless 
error and the de facto officer doctrine. We 
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therefore assume that section 3348(e)(1) 
renders the actions of an improperly serving 
Acting General Counsel voidable, not void, 
and consider the two arguments the Board 
posits in its supplemental brief. We express 
no view on whether section 3348(e)(1) could 
be understood more broadly to wholly 
insulate the Acting General Counsel's actions 
even in the event of an FVRA violation. We 
similarly express no view on defenses the 
Board never raised. 
 
i. Harmless Error 
 
We first address the “rule of prejudicial 
error.” As previously discussed, we held in 
Doolin that any statutory defect in the acting 
director's authority was cured because a 
subsequent, properly appointed director 
ratified his actions. The Board does not rely 
on Doolin's holding—understandably, 
inasmuch as no properly appointed General 
Counsel ratified the ULP complaint against 
Southwest. The Board instead relies on a 
paragraph of dicta from Doolin. In Doolin, 
we analogized a complaint in an 
administrative enforcement proceeding to a 
grand jury indictment in a criminal 
proceeding. Defects in a grand jury 
indictment do not constitute reversible error, 
Doolin noted, unless they “prejudiced” the 
defendant. And a defect does not prejudice 
the defendant if a petit jury subsequently 
finds him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The same logic might apply, we postulated in 
Doolin, if an agency adjudicator finds a 
petitioner liable despite a defective 
administrative complaint. Doolin ultimately 
declined to rely on this hypothesis, however, 
because the parties had not briefed it. Here, 
on the other hand, the Board brings Doolin 's 
dicta to the forefront and argues that the 
NLRB's final order renders harmless any 
defect in the ULP complaint against 
Southwest. 
 
The grand jury analogy in Doolin, like the 
doctrine of harmless error generally, focuses 
on the existence vel non of “prejudice[ ]” to 
the petitioner. But a petitioner need not 
demonstrate prejudice in the first place if the 
alleged error is “structural” in nature. In the 
grand jury context, for example, the 
occurrence of race or sex discrimination in 
the selection of grand jurors constitutes a 
structural error that warrants automatic 
reversal. In the agency context, we concluded 
in Landry that “[i]ssues of separation of 
powers” are structural errors that do not 
require a showing of prejudice because “it 
will often be difficult or impossible for 
someone subject to a wrongly designed 
scheme to show that the design—the 
structure—played a causal role in his loss.” 
“[D]emand for a clear causal link to a party's 
harm” would frustrate the “ ‘prophylactic’ ” 
goal of the separation of powers—i.e., “ 
‘establishing high walls and clear distinctions 
because low walls and vague distinctions will 
not be judicially defensible in the heat of 
interbranch conflict.’ ” Landry rejected the 
argument that subsequent de novo review by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission 
could render harmless the fact that the ALJ 
was serving in violation of the Appointments 
Clause. “If the process of final de novo 
review could cleanse the violation of its 
harmful impact,” Landry reasoned, “then all 
such arrangements would escape judicial 
review.”  
 
Southwest contends that an FVRA violation 
is a structural error that cannot be rendered 
harmless by subsequent de novo review. We 
do not reach that question, however, because 
we agree with another one of Southwest's 
arguments. Specifically, the grand jury 
analogy from Doolin is ill-suited in this case. 
In a criminal proceeding, the grand jury and 
petit jury are similarly situated and have the 
same basic task: determining the defendant's 
guilt under the requisite standard of proof 
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(“probable cause” and “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” respectively). As such, “[a] later 
conviction by a petit jury supplies virtual 
certainty that a properly constituted grand 
jury would have indicted.” Here, however, 
we lack the same certainty. The NLRB 
General Counsel is statutorily independent 
from the Board, and he has “final authority” 
over the issuance of ULP complaints. He 
essentially exercises prosecutorial discretion: 
he need not issue a complaint even if he 
believes a ULP was committed. Moreover, 
the General Counsel sets the enforcement 
priorities for the NLRB and generally 
supervises its lawyers. During oral argument, 
the Board conceded that, if the General 
Counsel's office were vacant, the NLRB 
“would not be issuing complaints.” The 
Board nonetheless argued that, because the 
type of ULP charged against Southwest was 
not “of substantial legal interest” to Acting 
General Counsel Solomon, that particular 
complaint did not require submission to the 
General Counsel's Office for review 
beforehand. Southwest rightly points out, 
however, that a different General Counsel 
may have imposed different requirements 
and procedures during his tenure. 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the final Board 
order, we cannot be confident that the 
complaint against Southwest would have 
issued under an Acting General Counsel 
other than Solomon. Our uncertainty is 
sufficient to conclude that Southwest has 
carried its burden of demonstrating that the 
FVRA violation is non-harmless under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. We therefore 
conclude that the NLRB order did not ratify 
or otherwise render harmless the FVRA 
defect in the ULP complaint against 
Southwest. We note, however, that our 
conclusion does not control whether the 
ineligibility of an official with prosecutorial 
responsibilities in other contexts should be 
considered harmless. 
 
ii. De Facto Officer Doctrine 
 
The only other argument in the Board's 
supplemental brief is the de facto officer 
doctrine. This oft-forgotten doctrine has 
“feudal origins,” dating back to the 15th 
century. The doctrine “confers validity upon 
acts performed by a person acting under the 
color of official title even though it is later 
discovered that the legality of that person's 
appointment or election to office is 
deficient.” In its most recent cases, however, 
the Supreme Court has limited the doctrine, 
declining to apply it when reviewing 
Appointments Clause challenges, and 
important statutory defects to an adjudicator's 
authority. 
 
In its traditional form, the de facto officer 
doctrine distinguishes between “direct” and 
“collateral” attacks on an officer's authority. 
A collateral attack challenges “government 
action on the ground that the officials who 
took the action were improperly in office.” 
The de facto officer doctrine bars such 
attacks. A direct attack, by contrast, 
challenges “the qualifications of the officer, 
rather than the actions taken by the officer.” 
The de facto officer doctrine allows such 
attacks but they can be brought via writ of 
quo warranto only. To obtain quo warranto 
against a federal official, an interested party 
must petition the Attorney General of the 
United States to institute a proceeding in 
federal district court. If the Attorney General 
declines, the interested party can petition the 
court to issue the writ instead. Both the 
Attorney General and the court, however, 
have “broad discretion” to decline to make 
use of quo warranto.  
 
This Court has rejected the traditional version 
of the de facto officer doctrine. Direct action 
via quo warranto is too “cumbersome,” we 
explained in Andrade, and “could easily 
operate to deprive a plaintiff with an 
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otherwise legitimate claim of the opportunity 
to have his case heard.” We disapprove of 
any “interpretation of the de facto officer 
doctrine that ... would render legal norms 
concerning appointment and eligibility to 
hold office unenforceable.” Instead, we have 
held that collateral attacks on an official's 
authority are permissible when two 
requirements are satisfied: 
 
First, the plaintiff must bring his 
action at or around the time that the 
challenged government action is 
taken. Second, the plaintiff must 
show that the agency or department 
involved has had reasonable notice 
under all the circumstances of the 
claimed defect in the official's title to 
office. 
 
Both requirements are met here. 
 
The first requirement, as stated in Andrade, 
appears on its face not to fit this case. The 
plaintiffs in Andrade filed a separate suit for 
injunctive and declaratory relief, which 
explains the Court's instruction to “bring [an] 
action at or around the time the challenged 
government action is taken.” Here, by 
contrast, Southwest is subject to an 
enforcement action brought by the NLRB. In 
these circumstances, we have held, a party 
satisfies the first Andrade requirement if it 
challenges an officer's authority as a defense 
to the enforcement action. Of course, the 
ordinary rules of exhaustion and forfeiture 
still apply. In the administrative proceedings 
below, Southwest raised its FVRA challenge 
as an exception to the ALJ decision. It 
therefore complied with the NLRA's 
jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. And 
the Board does not assert that Southwest's 
challenge was otherwise untimely or 
forfeited. Thus, we assume it was properly 
preserved. 
 
Nor does the Board contest that the second 
Andrade requirement—notice—is also 
satisfied here. To meet this requirement, “the 
agency ... [must] actually know[ ] of the 
claimed defect.” Notice ensures that the 
agency has a chance to “remedy any defects 
(especially narrowly technical defects) either 
before it permits invalidly appointed officials 
to act or shortly thereafter.” Here, Southwest 
notified the NLRB of the defect in Solomon's 
authority by excepting to the ALJ decision. 
The Board does not challenge the adequacy 
of this notice. Moreover, the notice 
requirement is satisfied if the agency learns 
of the defect from any source, not only the 
petitioner. The Board has not informed us 
when it first became aware of Solomon's 
problematic service. We therefore cannot say 
that its notice of the FVRA defect was 
inadequate. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the de facto officer doctrine does not bar 
Southwest from challenging Solomon's 
authority. 
 
Finally, we emphasize the narrowness of our 
decision. We hold that the former Acting 
General Counsel of the NLRB, Lafe 
Solomon, served in violation of the FVRA 
from January 5, 2011 to November 4, 2013. 
But this case is not Son of Noel Canning and 
we do not expect it to retroactively  
undermine a host of NLRB decisions. We 
address the FVRA objection in this case 
because the petitioner raised the issue in its 
exceptions to the ALJ decision as a defense 
to an ongoing enforcement proceeding. We 
doubt that an employer that failed to timely 
raise an FVRA objection—regardless 
whether enforcement proceedings are 
ongoing or concluded—will enjoy the same 
success.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the 
petition for review, deny the cross-
application for enforcement and vacate the 
NLRB order. So ordered. 
110 
 
“U.S. justices to mull president's power to nominate officials” 
 
Reuters 
Robert Iafolla 
June 20, 2016 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday 
to review a lower court decision that 
invalidated part of a former U.S. labor board 
official’s tenure, in a case that could curb the 
next president’s power to staff top positions 
in his or her administration. 
The justices will hear an appeal of a 2015 
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit saying that once President 
Barack Obama nominated Lafe Solomon in 
2011 to be general counsel of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Solomon 
should not have continued to fill the position 
on a temporary or "acting" basis pending 
Senate confirmation. 
The appeals court said a 1998 federal law 
bars anyone from serving in an acting role 
while they are the nominee unless they were 
previously the "first assistant" to that post. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the case could 
decide if the White House can temporarily fill 
high-level administration positions with 
nominees waiting for confirmation, which 
could take on added importance if the next 
president faces protracted nomination battles 
in the Senate. 
The case will give the Supreme Court a 
second chance to weigh in on executive 
branch authority related to filling positions at 
the NLRB. In 2014, the court in NLRB v. Noel 
Canning ruled that three 2013 appointments 
Obama made to the board while Congress 
was in recess were invalid. 
Although Obama withdrew Solomon’s 
stalled nomination in 2013, about six current 
high-level officials are serving on an acting 
basis while they await a Senate vote, 
including officials at the Department of 
Health and Human Services and the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the 
NLRB said in its petition for review. 
Former presidents Bill Clinton and George 
W. Bush also tapped officials to permanently 
fill the posts that they were manning in a 
temporary capacity, the NLRB said. 
Clinton, Bush and Obama all relied on an 
interpretation of the Federal Vacancies 
Reform Act that viewed the restriction on 
first assistants as only applying to people who 
automatically become acting officers under a 
chain of command, rather than those 
nominated by the president, the NLRB said. 
But the D.C. Circuit, as well as the 9th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2016 ruling, 
have disagreed. 
The case is NLRB v. SW General Inc, No. 15-
1251, in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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“Again, the president’s power to appoint is at issue” 
 
SCOTUSblog 
Lyle Denniston 
June 20, 2016 
 
For the second time in two years, the 
Supreme Court on Monday assigned itself the 
task of clarifying the president’s power to fill 
government posts — even as the Court awaits 
a nominee to join its own ranks.  The new 
case — like one in 2014 — involves the 
staffing of the National Labor Relations 
Board.  At issue this time is when the 
president may name someone to perform a 
high-level federal office in an “acting” 
capacity, affecting many posts throughout the 
bureaucracy. 
In another newly granted case, the Court will 
clarify the federal government’s power to 
hold in detention people who have no legal 
right to enter or be in the country, pending 
their deportation.  Both that and the 
appointments case will be heard and decided 
at the Court’s next Term, starting in October.  
At this point, it may be that both cases will be 
heard by an eight-Justice Court, because of 
the continuing uncertainty over a nominee to 
succeed the late Justice Antonin Scalia.  
There is no provision in federal law for 
naming an “acting” Justice when there is a 
vacancy. 
In a third significant action on Monday, the 
Court declined to consider Second 
Amendment challenges to state bans on 
assault weapons, in Connecticut and New 
York.  That echoed a similar refusal last 
December to review the constitutionality of 
such a ban in a Chicago suburb, Highland 
Park.  Turned aside this time were the 
Connecticut case of Shew v. Malloy and the 
New York case of Kampfer v. Cuomo.   No 
Justice noted a dissent from either denial.  
Justice Clarence Thomas had dissented when 
the Court passed up the issue in December; 
he was joined at that time by Scalia. 
In addition, the Court asked for the federal 
government’s view on whether it should hear 
two new patent disputes.  The combined 
cases of Amgen v. Sandoz and Sandoz v. 
Amgen grow out of a decision by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
adding more time to the supposedly 
abbreviated process of government approval 
of the marketing of “biosimilars” — that is, 
products that are similar to existing biologics, 
now a major source of new products for 
medical treatment.  In the case of Impression 
Products v. Lexmark International, a dispute 
over the sale of refilled toner cartridges for 
computer printers raises the issue of when a 
patent holder loses exclusive rights after the 
item has been sold, if post-sale restrictions 
have been imposed.  There is no time limit for 
the U.S. Solicitor General to offer the 
government’s views. 
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The new dispute over presidential 
appointment powers — NLRB v. SW 
General Inc. — revolves around the meaning 
of a federal law that was passed in 1998 in a 
move by Congress to curb the use of “acting” 
appointments to fill spots in government 
offices without going through the Senate 
confirmation process.  There is no 
constitutional issue involved this time, as 
there was in 2014 when the Court ruled in 
NLRB v. Noel Canning that the president has 
limited authority under the Constitution to fill 
a government position when the Senate was 
in recess and thus unable to act on a nominee. 
Congress has been controlling the authority 
of the president to fill vacancies since it first 
passed a law on that subject in 1898.  The 
lawmakers decided to put new limits on that 
authority in 1998; at that time, one out of 
every five officials whose job required 
presidential nomination and Senate 
confirmation were serving in an “acting” 
capacity well beyond the time limits 
specified in the 1898 law. 
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act was 
passed to reclaim the Senate’s role on filling 
vacancies to high-level government posts.  At 
issue in the new NLRB case is the scope of 
presidential authority to give someone an 
“acting” assignment if the president has 
nominated that person to the position but the 
Senate has not yet acted.  The dispute 
involves President Obama’s appointment of 
an “acting” general counsel of the NLRB.  
The general counsel has the final authority to 
issue complaints of unfair labor practices in 
management-labor dealings. 
SW General Inc., which operates ambulance 
services in Arizona, challenged a decision 
that it had committed an unfair labor practice 
in ending a system of annual bonuses for 
emergency technicians, nurses, and 
paramedics.  The board’s action was illegal 
because the case was initiated by an “acting” 
general counsel whom the president did not 
have the power to appoint, the company 
contended. 
The Supreme Court will act on the question 
of presidential power without ruling on the 
particular unfair labor practice case that gave 
rise to that question. 
In the other case in which the Court granted 
review on Monday, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
the Court is being asked by the federal 
government to reinforce its authority to hold 
foreign nationals in detention while the issue 
of deportation is under review.  The specific 
issue is whether the government must hold a 
hearing, at which a foreign national may seek 
release, every six months for all people held 
in detention after entering or being in the 
country without legal permission. 
In taking that question to the Court, the 
Justice Department contended that the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had 
“replaced the carefully tailored regime [for 
detention of illegal foreign nationals] with a 
rigid, one-size-fits-all rule that every alien in 
detention” must be given a release hearing 
automatically every six months.  That 
approach, the department contended, will 
jeopardize its authority to hold those who 
have committed crimes or acts of terrorism.
Contents of the article, broken into two 
separate columns, like so
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“D.C. Circuit Court Invalidates Solomon’s Appointment As Acting 
NLRB General Counsel– What Does It Mean?” 
 
The National Law Review 
Peter M. Panken 
August 13, 2015 
 
On August 7, in SW General Inc. v. NLRB 
2015 US App LEXIS 13812, a federal 
appellate court ruled that the January 5, 2011 
appointment of Lafe Solomon as Acting 
General Counsel to the NLRB violated the 
Federal Vacancies Reform Act 5 U.S.C. 
Sections 3345 et. seq. (FVRA) (PDF). For 
that reasons it held that his authorizations to 
issue an unfair labor practice (“ULP”) 
complaint in the case was invalid and the 
NLRB’s decision finding the employer guilty 
of ULPs must be vacated. Since Solomon 
served as Acting General Counsel until 
November 4, 2013, the Court’s decision 
renders potentially suspect any and all NLRB 
ULP  decisions based upon complaints issued 
during that period. 
Noel Canning 
In NLRB v. Noel Canning 134 S. Ct. 2550 
(2014) the Supreme Court invalidated a 
plethora of NLRB decisions based on its 
finding that the appointments of Board 
members who had participated in the 
decisions  were  invalid recess appointments 
because the Court found that the Senate was 
not in fact in recess at the time the 
appointments were made. In the wake of 
Noel Canning, the Board, then composed of 
members whose appointments had been 
properly confirmed by the Senate 
reconsidered and reissued most of those 
decisions.  SW General  seems to be another 
decision invalidating a scheme by the 
Administration to get around Senate 
roadblocks to appointments which has been 
invalidated by the Courts. 
The Impact of SW General 
But the Court in SW General made clear that 
its holding in that case would actually be 
much narrower in its impact.  That is because 
it held that if an employer had  not timely 
raised the issue of the General Counsel’s 
appointment,  the defense was waived: 
We hold that the former Acting 
General Counsel of the NLRB, Lafe 
Solomon, served in violation of the 
FVRA from January 5, 2011 to 
November 4, 2013. But this case is 
not Son of Noel Canning and we do 
not expect it to retroactively 
undermine a host of NLRB decisions. 
We address the FVRA objection in 
this case because the petitioner raised 
the issue in its exceptions to the ALJ 
decision as a defense to an ongoing 
enforcement proceeding. We doubt 
that an employer that failed to timely 
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raise an FVRA objection—regardless 
whether enforcement proceedings are 
ongoing or concluded—will enjoy the 
same success. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); 
Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1499. 
In SW General, the defense was raised in 
exceptions to the Administrative Law 
Judge’s decision. Whether it can be raised 
after the decision by the NLRB is 
questionable.  29 U.S.C. Sec 160 (e) 
specifically provides: No objection that has 
not been urged before the Board, its member, 
agent, or agency, shall be considered by the 
court, unless the failure or neglect to urge 
such objection shall be excused because of 
extraordinary circumstances In Andrade v. 
Lauer, 729 F2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the 
DC Circuit set forth the requirements needed 
to attack decisions by an invalidly appointed 
official: 
The core purposes of the doctrine are 
served if a plaintiff challenging 
government action on the ground that 
the officials taking that action 
improperly hold office meets two 
requirements. First, the plaintiff must 
bring this action at or around the time 
that the challenged government 
action is taken. Second, the plaintiff 
must show that the agency or 
department involved has had 
reasonable notice under all the 
circumstances of the claimed defect 
in the official’s title to office. This 
does not require that the plaintiff 
perform any particular rituals before 
bringing suit, nor does it mandate that 
the agency’s knowledge of the 
alleged defect must come from the 
plaintiff. It does, however, require 
that the agency or department 
involved actually knows of the 
claimed defect. 
What This Means for Employers 
Thus, employers found to have committed 
unfair labor practices in proceedings between 
January 5, 2011 and November 4, 2013, 
during Lafe Solomon’s  tenure as  Acting 
General Counsel should review the status of 
the proceedings against them and determine 
whether they are still able  to raise this issue 
as quickly as possible in any proceeding 
which has not yet been decided by the NLRB. 
